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Every law, when probed and prodded, tells a story about its historical
trajectory, a nonlinear transformation with neither a definitive beginning nor an
end. The ensuing legal history is an insightful glimpse into a law’s past that is likely
unfamiliar—perhaps even unexpected. That legal narrative may not be relevant to
present-day legal concerns, or it may have immediate resonance to a contemporary
dilemma. In either case, it may be exploited by legal actors in pursuit of an agenda.
For a legal historian, the challenge is to tell the story of a law while resisting
attempts to simplify or to exploit the complexities of history.
The story I will tell here focuses on legal norms of wife-initiated (and
acquired) divorce in Jewish and Islamic legal systems in the late antique and
medieval eras.1 The received tradition narrates a woman’s minimal agency in
divorce—in both Jewish and Islamic law—as intrinsic.2 It is widely known—or
presumed—that Jewish and Muslim women have relatively less access to divorce
than their male counterparts in present-day Jewish and Islamic courts.3 In both
traditions, women can encounter difficulties in obtaining divorces.4 Combining
documentary and literary-legal sources, this Article presents evidence that Jewish
and Muslim women in the late antique period had relatively more access to
divorce than women in the medieval era.5 I argue that changes in women’s divorce
1. I narrate this story in two voices: the text of this Article for the general reader and most
(though not all) of the footnotes for the specialist reader.
2. The reader may wonder what motivates this particular focus on Jewish and Islamic legal
systems, or why Christian legal systems are not represented in this study. This research was built
around a specific point of intersection between these two legal systems, which is explored in infra
Section IV, Disenchanting the Orthodox Narratives.
3. “The ruling now prevalent is that a woman initiating divorce proceedings according to
Jewish law is required to submit a ground, chosen from a defined list appearing in the Talmud;
barring such a ground, the husband cannot be coerced to grant a divorce.” Elimelech Westreich, The
Rise and Decline of the Law of the Rebellious Wife in Medieval Jewish Law, in XII JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION
STUDIES (ZUTPHEN CONFERENCE) 207 (Hillel Gamoran ed., 2002). Generally, in modern states that
apply Islamic laws in some form, Muslim women are able to secure a divorce if (a) they can establish
specific, judicially accepted grounds or (b) they relinquish their dower rights and negotiate a husband’s
consent. (Exceptions to this general situation are Egypt and Tunisia, which do not require the
husband’s consent.) See Islamic Law Project, Legal Profiles, EMORY UNIV. SCH. LAW (2002), available at
http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/index2.html.
4. For a discussion of the Jewish chained wife (the agunah, a woman unable to obtain a divorce
decree), see 1 BERNARD S. JACKSON, AGUNAH: THE MANCHESTER ANALYSIS (2011). By way of
example, see a modern United States case, Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983), which
found enforceable a Jewish marital agreement requiring fulfilment of Jewish divorce laws. See also
MICHAEL J. BROYDE, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND THE ABANDONED WIFE IN JEWISH LAW: A
CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AGUNAH PROBLEMS IN AMERICA (2001). In this Article, I
translate get as divorce decree. On some of the difficulties encountered by Muslim women seeking
divorces and contemporary legislation pertaining to it, see Oussama Arabi, The Dawning of the Third
Millennium on Shari'a: Egypt’s Law No. 1 of 2000, or Women May Divorce at Will, 16 ARAB L.Q. 2 (2001).
See also Muhammad Munir, Judicial Law Making: An Analysis of Case Law on Khulʿ in Pakistan (Apr.
5 2012) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2034964. However, during my
relatively recent legal-ethnographic research (sponsored by a Fulbright grant) of Jordan’s Islamic
courts, I did not observe judges restricting women from initiating or obtaining divorces; the main
challenge women faced was receiving alimony and child support payments, not divorces.
5. While some feminists and some religious reformers may find that this Article resonates
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options are manifestations of multidimensional historical processes that illustrate
law’s profoundly contingent contexts.6 Divorce in Jewish and Islamic legal systems
underwent parallel transformations between the late antique (roughly, 250–800
CE) and medieval (roughly, 800–1450 CE) periods as the result of common sociopolitical and jurisprudential dynamics. By placing Jewish law and Islamic law into
historical conversation with each other, this Article challenges the norm of
studying these legal systems from a primarily internal perspective. In addition, this
Article resists the conventional heuristics of comparative legal studies by replacing
notions of “influence” or “transplant” with recognition of parallel legal changes
and shared legal culture.
Legal communities use narratives to illustrate legal rules and also create
“internal” narratives about their legal systems that have normative consequences.
The analysis presented here establishes that any statement of “what the law is ” is
embedded within a complex historical narrative generated by jurists. Jewish and
Muslim jurists construct internal narratives that are ahistorical and legitimate their
own authority; I identify these narratives as “orthodox” and illustrate how they are
espoused by both historical actors and contemporary scholars.7 This Article
employs historicism and thick descriptions of law to challenge those orthodox
narratives.8 Influencing the outcome of those discussions, in terms of specific legal
norms, is not my objective here.9 Rather, the underlying aim of this piece is to use
historicism to challenge the legal authority of authoritarian groups.10 The narration

with or lends support to their own objectives, this is an unintended consequence of exploring the
legal narrative. It should be noted that this is merely one case study and the stories of other laws may
reveal a past that corresponds to very different values and expectations. Instead of advocating for a
specific doctrinal change, this Article intends to illuminate aspects of Islamic and Jewish legal history
that remain unappreciated. See CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, FEMINISM WITHOUT BORDERS:
DECOLONIZING THEORY, PRACTICING SOLIDARITY (2003) (explaining that feminist strategies are
not homogenous).
6. As Foucault notes, “The purpose of history is to dissipate, not discover, the roots of our
identity.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE FOUCAULT READER 95 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984).
7. As I use orthodoxy in this Article, it is entirely unrelated to contemporary terminology
(such as modern Orthodox Judaism). Instead, orthodox simply means the existence of a (hierarchical)
group or institution that is able to label certain religious groups or practices as heretical.
8. By historicism, I mean specifically post-foundationalist, radical historicism. See Mark Bevir,
What is Genealogy?, 2 J. PHIL. HIST. 263 (2008) [hereinafter Bevir, What is Genealogy?] (explaining radical
historicism). Radical historicism is distinct from general historicist approaches. See Mark Bevir, Why
Historical Distance Is Not a Problem, 50 HIST. & THEORY 24 (2011). Moreover, the critical component of
this project is not historicism, but rather the regional, non-reified narrative of near eastern legal
history (the “interwoven” narrative that I present in Section V) that subverts conventional
assumptions.
9. I intentionally abstain from modern and anachronistic conclusions. This is an ethical stance
in opposition to the totalizing project of modernity. See, e.g., TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF
RELIGION (1993).
10. Similarly, Abou El Fadl has described some of his scholarly work as pursuing a
demonstration of historical malleability. He noted, “By presenting the diversity within the legal
discourse, I hoped to demonstrate the inability of the authoritarian to dominate and establish
uniformity over certain issues in Islamic legal history.” KHALED M. ABOU EL FADL, AND GOD
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of legal changes outlined in this Article is just one exploration into the shared
nomos of Jewish and Islamic legal systems and the socio-political struggles over law
within it.11
Recent, increased scholarly attention to the role of religion in the public
sphere has invigorated legal discussions of the (in)compatibility of modern law
and religious law. But these debates in contemporary public discourse tend to
ossify religious legal systems and to authorize certain voices over others. It is not
my intention to accommodate religion to neoliberal values, or to discover the lost
purity or goodness of religion, or even to denounce religion. These normative
strategies are frequently counterproductive because they reify religion and
subscribe to a false religious-secular dichotomy.12 This Article challenges the terms
of contemporary debates by highlighting the dissimilar voices within religious legal
systems and by problematizing the monolithic conceptualization of “religious law”
that underlies current controversies. Indeed, the plurality of legal opinions within
each legal system and the diversity of legal practices among Muslims and Jews
attest to the density of these normative spaces. The forces of change in these two
“religious” legal systems are not so different than in any other legal system; it is
the “law” aspect of these normative orders, rather than the “religion” aspect, that
is my emphasis because legal analysis is essential to understanding both Jewish and
Islamic legal systems.
This Article analyzes historical evidence of both Jewish and Muslim women
divorcing their husbands in late antiquity (roughly, 250–800 CE) and offers some
provisional explanations for why women’s divorce options became more limited
between 800 and 1450 CE). This case study indicates that comparative legal
history—as implemented in this Article—illuminates dynamics of legal change
that would otherwise remain unnoticed. Studying a legal system in isolation from
its context, which includes contiguous legal systems, obscures expansive and longterm changes. Instead, by plotting parallel changes over time in divorce practices
among Jews and Muslims in the “Near East,” this Article demonstrates that legal
orthodoxy is not timeless or uniform.13 Jewish and Islamic divorce laws tell stories

KNOWS THE SOLDIERS: THE AUTHORITATIVE AND AUTHORITARIAN IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSES 35
(2001).
11. On nomos, see Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
(I thank Michael A. Helfand for suggesting the relevance of Cover’s article.) See also Judith Resnik,
Living Their Legal Commitments: Paideic Communities, Courts, and Robert Cover, 17 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 17
(2005).
12. Fitzgerald explains, “The concept of ‘a religion’ and its pluralization ‘religions’ is a modern
category, has a specific set of historical conditions for its emergence . . . and is a fundamental part of
modern Western ideology.” Timothy Fitzgerald, Introduction to RELIGION AND THE SECULAR:
HISTORICAL AND COLONIAL FORMATIONS 1, 6 (Timothy Fitzgerald ed., 2007).
13. The “Near East” (and its modern equivalent, the “Middle East”) is a problematic political,
rather than geographic category. Indeed, “The Middle East exists because the West has possessed
sufficient power to give the idea substance. In this regard the colonial past and imperial present are
parts of the equation that make the Middle East real.” Michael Ezekiel Gasper, Conclusion: There Is a
Middle East!, in IS THERE A MIDDLE EAST?: THE EVOLUTION OF A GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPT 231,
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that are sporadic, unpredictable, and barely audible under the faux euphony of
orthodoxy.
I. DEFINING WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE14
It is widely presumed that men have unlimited access and women have
restricted access to initiate divorce in both Jewish and Islamic law.15 This
presumption, however, simplifies a complicated historical process—only part of
which I will briefly explore here—in which a woman’s access to divorce changed
over time. I will focus primarily on jurisprudential texts and only secondarily on
how these jurisprudential ideas were actually implemented because the surviving
documentary sources make it difficult to reconstruct exactly what kind of access to
divorce women—both Muslim and Jewish—had in the late antique and medieval
periods.16 In what follows, I will present two concise chronologies of Jewish legal
changes and Islamic legal changes in women’s access to divorce.
I will intentionally not differentiate between a wife’s ability to “initiate” a
divorce and her ability to “execute” a divorce. Despite some ambiguous evidence,
there is a strong normative presumption that women could not “cause” a divorce
because a husband must deliver a divorce decree—a written one in the Jewish
tradition and an oral one in the Islamic tradition.17 As will become evident, these
two procedural moves—initiating and executing divorce—were likely more
ambiguous (at least in late antiquity) than commonly assumed. A wife’s ability to
initiate divorce has legal effect only where a husband’s divorce prerogative is
circumscribed—either by a court or by the wife herself. Moreover, while family
members were often involved in a Jewish or Muslim woman’s marriage, women
were frequently independent actors during divorce.18 In describing women as
240 (Michael E. Bonine et al. eds., 2012). I would prefer to use the more geographically descriptive
(and less geopolitically constructed) term Southwest Asia, but the reader may be unfamiliar with this
term. As I use “Near East” here, I primarily refer to Mesopotamia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant,
and Egypt. I recognize that “Near East” is not a fixed region and that the geographic references in
this Article are fluid, rather than systematic.
14. A preliminary version of this section was presented as an invited presentation at “Cross
Currents: Jewish and Islamic Cultural Exchange, 600–1250 CE,” a symposium organized by the Joint
Doctoral Program in Jewish Studies at the Graduate Theological Union and University of California,
Berkeley (Oct. 14, 2010).
15.
I will not discuss any of the rabbinic limitations placed on a husband’s ability to divorce
because it is beyond the scope of my analysis. But see Mishnah, Gīṭṭīn 9:10 (recounting debate between
Shammai and Hillel about a husband’s legitimate grounds for divorcing his wifeadultery or any
reason); see also Babylonian Talmud, Gīṭṭīn 90a. Generally, Islamic law does not restrict a husband’s
ability to divorce his wife, except by limiting the number of times a husband can divorce the same
wife after remarriage.
16. A social history approach of investigating actual divorce processes cannot be sufficiently
reconstructed using the available historical evidence.
17. See the discussion in Avishalom Westreich, History, Dogmatics and Hermeneutics: The Divorce
Clause in Palestinian Ketubbot and the Geonic Compulsion of Divorce 2 (Agunah Research Unit, Working
Paper No. 15, 2009).
18. Goitein notes, “At a divorce the wife normally acted on her own. As customary as it was
that the betrothal be enacted in the absence of the bride, the divorce, by contrast, required her
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autonomous legal actors, this Article does not project modern notions of women’s
agency.
II. A JUDAIC CHRONOLOGY OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE19
A. Rabbinic Era (70–620 CE )
There is a thorny scholarly debate surrounding the evidence for Jewish
women obtaining divorces or actually divorcing their spouses in antiquity and late
antiquity.20 Without delving into the details, it is evident that the diverse and
varied situations of pre- and non-rabbinic Jewish women included wife-initiated
divorce.21 The key documentary evidence is Aramaic marriage contracts of the
Elephantine Jewish community dated to the fifth century BCE, which include a
stipulation that a wife may initiate divorce and pay her husband a divorce
settlement (i.e., not collect her dower).22 At least some Jewish women were able to
divorce their husbands in the antique and late antique periods.
presence.” 3 S.D. GOITEIN, A MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY: THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF THE
ARAB WORLD AS PORTRAYED IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE CAIRO GENIZA 270 (1978). Muslim
women also frequently represented themselves in divorce, as will be discussed below in the Islamic
chronology of wife-initiated divorce.
19. The periodization of Jewish legal history and dates of rabbinic texts used in this section
are modified versions of the dates used in contemporary Jewish studies. See THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO THE TALMUD AND RABBINIC LITERATURE, at xiii–xvi (Charlotte Elisheva
Fonrobert & Martin S. Jaffee eds., 2007). For a critical analysis of periodization in Jewish legal history,
see Shlomo Zalman Havlin, On Literary Canonization as a Basis for Periodization in Halakha, in
RESEARCHES IN TALMUDIC LITERATURE: A CONFERENCE IN HONOUR OF THE EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY OF SHAUL LIEBERMAN 148 (Saul Liberman ed., 1983). Since most Jewish legal sources
represent rabbinic legal opinions, Qaraite and other sectarian legal practices are not fully represented
in this chronology; references to documentary sources are provided whenever possible in an effort to
alleviate this imbalance.
20. See David Instone Brewer, Jewish Women Divorcing Their Husbands in Early Judaism: The
Background to Papyrus Ṣeʾelim 13, 92 HARV. THEOLOGICAL REV. 349 (1999); Bernard S. Jackson, Some
Reflections on Family Law in the Papyri, in JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES XIV 141 (Hillel Gamoran
ed., 2002); see also Robert Brody, Evidence for Divorce by Jewish Women?, 50 J. JEWISH STUD. 230 (1999).
21. “This right of women to divorce their husbands appears to have become a normal part of
Egyptian Judaism . . . . This is very different from Palestinian and later rabbinic Judaism where a
woman could only demand a divorce on . . . specific grounds[.]” Brewer, supra note 20, at 354. Also,
in Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their husbands under the Roman law.”
Id. at 356 (citing evidence from Josephus). But note that Jewish women may not at this time (under
the Herodians, 37 BCE to 92 CE) have perceived divorcing their husbands as being under Roman
rather than Jewish law.
22.
Friedman notes that “[t]his right is embodied in a stipulation written in the marriage
contracts from the fifth century BCE Jewish community of Elephantine. As we learn from the Geniza
fragments, such a stipulation was written in the ketubbot of Palestine through the eleventh century.
Passages that reflect the wife’s rights for a divorce can be identified in the Talmudic literature. And in
some localities, this usage became accepted legal practice in post-Talmudic times.” 1 MORDECHAI A.
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE: A CAIRO GENIZAH STUDY 313 (1980) [hereinafter 1
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE]; see also MORDECHAI A. FRIEDMAN, GENIZA
STUDIES IN JEWISH MARRIAGE LAW 4 (1970). Among the documentary evidence that Friedman
studied is Babatha’s marriage contract (ca. second century CE). See Mordechai A. Friedman, Babatha’s
‘Ketubba’: Some Preliminary Observations, 46 ISRAEL EXPLORATION J. 55 (1996). For the papyri, see
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This evidence of Jewish legal practice contrasts somewhat with the content
of rabbinic legal texts.23 Rabbinic jurisprudence on divorce is ostensibly built
around one Biblical verse, Deuteronomy 24:1, which describes a husband
delivering a divorce document to his wife.24 The verse does not specify if this
divorce procedure is the only legally valid form of divorce.25 But rabbinic jurists
elaborated a variety of justifications for divorce. In the Tosefta (compiled 220–350
CE), the rabbis claim that a couple may not continue their marriage if either is
afflicted with boils.26 The Mishnah (compiled in the early third century CE) briefly
considers when a woman can demand divorce because of her husband’s
impotence, her “uncleanliness,” or her vow not to have sex.27 The Mishnah also
enumerates how a wife gradually loses her divorce settlement for being
recalcitrant.28 Other rabbinic literature enumerates a husband’s unreasonable
behavior or defects that warrant a husband being forced to divorce his wife.29 In

THE DOCUMENTS FROM THE BAR KOKHBA PERIOD IN THE CAVE OF LETTERS: HEBREW,
ARAMAIC, AND NABATEAN-ARAMAIC PAPYRI 118–141 (Yigael Yadin et al. eds., 2002). Goitein
concurred with Friedman in 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 264.
23. Bernard Jackson has observed that “the social institution of marriage, as reflected in the
narratives, appears to deviate from the legal institution, as reflected in the laws . . . the narratives
conceive of divorce as being performed by expulsion or desertion while the law assumes that any such
expulsion (he ‘sends her out of his house’, Deut. 24:1, 3) is preceded by the writing and delivery of a
sefer keritut.” Bernard S. Jackson, The ‘Institutions’ of Marriage and Divorce in the Hebrew Bible, 56 J.
SEMITIC STUD. 221, 243 (2011).
24. “Suppose a man enters into marriage with a woman, but she does not please him because
he finds something objectionable about her, and so he writes her a certificate of divorce, puts it in her
hand, and sends her out of his house[.]” Deuteronomy 24:1 (The New Oxford Annotated Bible, 2010).
25. For a brief introduction to Jewish divorce laws, see RACHEL BIALE, WOMEN AND
JEWISH LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF WOMEN’S ISSUES IN HALAKHIC SOURCES 70–101 (1984). For a
more extensive examination, see SHLOMO RISKIN, A JEWISH WOMAN’S RIGHT TO DIVORCE: A
HALAKHIC HISTORY AND A SOLUTION FOR THE AGUNAH (2006). Riskin is a major modern
Orthodox rabbinic figure, and the arguments he presents in his text come from within an orthodox
perspective.
26. TOSEFTA, Ketubbot 7:11; see also MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:9-10 (stating that a husband can be
compelled to divorce his wife if he has certain blemishes or is repulsive).
27. MISHNAH, Nedarim 11:12 (describing three types of women who can be divorced, but
retain their dower). According to this passage, Jewish women used to make three claims (i.e., rape,
impotent husband, vow of refusal, or inability to engage in intercourse) that warranted divorce and
the full payment of the ketubbah, but the rabbinic sages changed these practices. In the late antique
Near East, vows were a common aspect of social discourse, such that a woman’s vow may be
understood as a pretext for initiating divorce.
28. “Recalcitrant,” in this Article, is equivalent to the category of moredet in Jewish law or
nāshiz in Islamic law—both of which concern a wife who is broadly perceived as disobedient to her
husband. (Both terms are also applied to men, but used more frequently to describe women.) Moredet
is often translated as “rebellious,” but I prefer to translate it as “recalcitrant.” Moreover, while there is
significant rabbinic-legal discussion about what acts constitute recalcitrance (typically, either denial of
sex or refusal to perform household chores), I contend that the wife’s actions are less significant than
the underlying issue of her desire to divorce her husband. In other words, a recalcitrant wife is
equivalent to a woman who is seeking a divorce. For a discussion of the moredet, see for example
MISHNAH, Ketubbot 1:2 (wife loses seven dinarim for every week of her recalcitrance).
29. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:1–5 (discussing various cases in which a husband makes
unconscionable/unreasonable restrictions that warrant compelling the husband to divorce); see also id.
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the Palestinian Talmud (compiled 220–425 CE), the rabbis comment that a
woman’s right to divorce consists of tormenting her husband until he gives her a
writ of divorce.30 But in the same text, it is suggested that, in accordance with a
marriage contract stipulation, a husband should divorce his wife and pay half the
dower (ketubbah) payment if the woman expresses an aversion to her husband.31
The Palestinian Talmud also includes a reference to a conditional divorce in which
a husband offers his wife a divorce decree if she pays him a specific sum—most
likely her dower.32 The Babylonian Talmud (compiled 200–650 CE) specifies that a
woman is entitled to her dower if her husband is infertile or impotent.33
Moreover, a woman whose husband refuses to provide her conjugal rights can be
divorced with the court’s intervention and receive her dower.34
To summarize, this survey of rabbinic literature indicates the following types
of divorce were recognized in late antiquity:
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.35
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife36 and pay the
dower because the husband:
(a) has physical defects;37
(b) imposes unreasonable restrictions or makes unreasonable
demands;38
(c) is sterile, impotent, or refuses to provide conjugal rights;39
(d) works in a profession considered disgusting;40

7:8–10 (stating that blemishes of which a wife was unaware warrant divorce); PALESTINIAN TALMUD,
Ketubbot 7:1–5 (describing husband’s behavior that warrants divorce). See also the corresponding
discussions in the BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 71a–71b, 77a.
30. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 5:1.
31. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 7:6. A marriage contract stipulation suggesting a wife’s
ability to initiate divorce is also acknowledged in Palestinian Talmud, Ketubbot 5:9.
32. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 7:5 (stating that if he says, “[T]his is your get if you pay me
200 zūz,” then she is divorced and pays). Two hundred zūz (silver pieces) is the default dower amount
for a previously unmarried Jewish woman. This particular divorce negotiation resembles one form of
khulʿ divorce in Islamic legal practice, which will be discussed below.
33. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 65a–65b.
34. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 5:6–7 (stating that a husband’s refusal to provide conjugal rights is
grounds for adding to a woman’s dower). BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 61b (stating that if a
husband refuses to provide his wife’s conjugal rights for longer than specified periods, he must
divorce her and pay her dower).
35.
See supra text accompanying note 15. The House of Shammai’s argument to limit a
husband’s ability to divorce was refuted by the House of Hillel. See MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 9:10. But the
ketubbah payment was perceived as an impediment to the husband’s otherwise unencumbered right to
divorce. See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 11a and Yebamot 89a.
36. MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 9:8; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 88b (explaining that a Jewish
court may compel a divorce, but a non-Jewish court may only do so based on the decision of a Jewish
court; specific type of divorce decree,  ;)גט מעושהMISHNAH, Arakhin 5:6 (stating a husband is
compelled to give a writ of divorce to his wife until he says he wills it).
37. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:9.
38. Id. at 7:1–5.
39. Id. at 5:6; see also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 91a.
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(e) or because the wife has made a vow prohibiting her husband from
touching her.41
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the
court has declared the wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach
of contract),42 or because the wife
(a) apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally;43
(b) refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of “wifely
duties”;44
(c) or has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital
relationship.45
The practical consequences of these rabbinic ideas on divorce likely varied
from community to community.46 Since the Palestinian tradition included a wife’s
right to divorce in the marriage contract, there may have been distinctions
between Palestinian and Babylonian divorce practices.47 Moreover, the rabbinic
prerogative of annulling a marriage may have, in practice, been a means of
granting a woman a divorce (without the husband’s deliverance of a divorce
decree).48 Still, this brief schema delineates the basic ideas circulating about
divorce within late antique rabbinic legal communities.
B. Geonic Era (620–1050 CE ) 49
In 650/651 CE, Geonic rabbis issued a decree (taqqanah) that a recalcitrant
wife (moredet) could procure a divorce immediately and not lose her dower
(ketubbah).50 This decree abandoned the twelve-month waiting period and loss of
40. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:10.
41. See supra text accompanying note 27.
42. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 5:5–7 (defining a recalcitrant wife); PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot
5:8 (stating that a “writ of rebellion” is a charge against or a deduction of the wife’s ketubbah
payment). BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 63a (stating that the ketubbah of a recalcitrant wife is
reduced to depletion and she is divorced).
43. MISHNAH, Ketubbot 7:6.
44. Id. at 5:7.
45. Id. at 7:8.
46. For a broad overview, see HISTORY OF JEWISH WOMEN IN LATE ANTIQUITY (Tal Ilan
ed., 1994).
47. 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 313; see also Westreich,
supra note 17, at 18–21.
48. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 3a and Gīṭṭīn 33a (explaining that rabbis can annul
betrothal by returning the dower money or by declaring the sexual act as non-marital, which
corresponds to the two means of enacting a marriage); see Avishalom Westreich, Umdena as a Ground
for Marriage Annulment: Between Mistaken Transaction (Kiddushei ta’ut) and Terminative Condition, 20
JEWISH L. ASS’N STUD. 330 (2010).
49. On Geonim, see ROBERT BRODY, THE GEONIM OF BABYLONIA AND THE SHAPING OF
MEDIEVAL JEWISH CULTURE (1998).
50. This is documented in the Geonic responsa of Rav Sherira Gaon (d. 1038, Babylon):
Originally, the legal requirement was that we do not coerce the husband to divorce his wife
if she requests a divorce, except in those [cases] in which the Rabbis stated that they do
coerce him to divorce her . . . . Later, they made another decree that they would make an
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dower stipulated for a recalcitrant wife in the Babylonian Talmud.51 Historical
sources indicate that this decree was viewed by the majority of Geonim as a legal
enactment validated by judicial authority and social need.52 Genizah evidence53
indicates that in the medieval Near East, Jewish women could initiate divorce by
announcement concerning her for four consecutive weeks . . . . Finally, they decreed that
they announce about her for four weeks and she would forfeit everything. Nevertheless,
they did not coerce the husband to write her a divorce document . . . . And they decreed
that they make her wait for a divorce for 12 months (from the time she asks for a divorce)
because they might reconcile and if they do not reconcile after 12 months, they coerce the
husband and he writes a divorce document for her. After our Sabboraic rabbis, when our
sages noticed that the daughters of Israel were going and relying upon Gentiles to acquire
for them divorce documents by force from their husbands and there would be those who
write divorce documents by coercion and it would be doubtful whether it was a legal or
illegal divorce and this would lead to calamity . . . . They decreed in the time of Mar Rav
Rabba son of Rav Hunai (may they rest in Eden) about a recalcitrant wife who requests a
divorce, that all of the nikhsei tzon barzel (dowry) that she brought with her [into the
marriage] he must pay for and that even what was destroyed or lost he must pay her . . .
And they coerce him and he writes for her a divorce document immediately and and she
receives one or two hundred [the standard dower]. By this custom we practice today as we
have for three hundred years and more. So should you do as well.
BENJAMIN MENASSEH LEWIN, OTSAR HA-GE’ONIM: TESHUVOT GE’ONE BAVEL U-FERUSHEHEM
‘AL PI SEDER HA-TALMUD 8:99–102 (1928). Also cited in RISKIN, supra note 25, at 56–59. Rav
Sherira Gaon also mentions this decree in THE IGGERES OF RAV SHERIRA GAON 126 (Nosson
Dovid Rabinowich trans., 1988). See also BRODY, supra note 49, at 62–63; GIDEON LIBSON, JEWISH
AND ISLAMIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CUSTOM DURING THE GEONIC PERIOD 111 (2003)
While I translate taqqanah as decree in this paper, it is to avoid confusing the reader. The literal
meaning of taqqanah is to straighten and it has the connotation of establishing, instituting, or
ordaining a legal rule.
51. In this Article, I assume that by 650 CE, either the Babylonian Talmud had been redacted
or much of the material in it was associated with a corpus that would later be identified as the
Babylonian Talmud. “In the case where a woman ‘rebels’ against her husband, her ketubbah (dower)
may be reduced by seven denarii a week. R. Judah said: seven tropaics. Our Masters went back and
deliberated that an announcement regarding her shall be made on four consecutive Sabbaths and that
then the court shall send her [the following warning]: ‘Be it known to you that even if your ketubbah
is for a hundred maneh you have forfeited it.’” BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 63b. “We also make
her wait twelve months, a [full] year for her divorce, and during these twelve months she receives no
maintenance from her husband.” Id. at 64a. The relevant passage features the story of a woman being
forced to remain married to her husband and implies that it is unwarranted to do so. But note that
Westreich identifies the twelve-month waiting period as a late Talmudic stratum. Avishalom
Westreich, Compelling a Divorce? Early Talmudic Roots of Coercion in a Case of Moredet 12 (Agunah Research
Unit, Working Paper No. 9, 2008).
52. A Gaon notes, “And now in the two yeshivas they rule on the recalcitrant wife that even
though she seized something from her ketubbah, we take it from her and we give it to the husband and
we give her a divorce document immediately.” SIMEON QAYYARA (9th century; Iraq), HALAKHOT
GEDOLOT § 36, Laws of Marriage. But see infra text accompanying note 59.
53.
Genizah marriage contracts include explicit stipulations that a wife may relinquish her
dower and be divorced “by the authorization of the court.” 2 MORDECHAI A. FRIEDMAN, JEWISH
MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE: A CAIRO GENIZAH STUDY 56 (1980). (For an example of Genizah
evidence, see the Taylor-Schechter Cairo Genizah Collection at Cambridge University Library TS 13 J
3, fol. 22, copied from S.D. Goitein’s Typed Texts. 07-09-90, N.H. (p).) Document of a full-fledged
barāʾa (release of spouse from obligations upon divorce) in which husband and wife from al-Mahalla
appear before the court of Fustat, Ab 4973/Ab 1524/August 1213. On Genizah sources generally,
see Marina Rustow, The Genizah and Jewish Communal History, in FROM A SACRED SOURCE: GENIZAH
STUDIES IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR STEFAN C. REIF 289 (Ben M. Outhwaite & Siam Bhayro eds.,
2011).

2014]

EVERY LAW TELLS A STORY

29

forfeiting some of their rights—what is often described as a “ransom” divorce, in
line with the equivalent Arabic terminology.54 This historical evidence should be
emphasized: the Geonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant”
wife was normative for centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval
period. In other words, when compared to the Rabbinic period (or, more
precisely, rabbinic texts), an additional option may have been introduced in which
a woman could obtain a divorce decree immediately (instead of waiting twelve
months) in exchange for relinquishing part (or all) of her economic rights. This
differs from the contract stipulation described in the Palestinian Talmud55 because
an explicit marriage contract stipulation does not appear to have been required
and because women appear to have been able to initiate divorce proceedings as a
result of the Geonic decree.56 This form of wife-initiated divorce appears to have
been implemented by the Geonim as an extension of the Talmudic category of a
recalcitrant wife.57 In his Halakhot Pesuqot, Rav Yehudai Ben Naḥman (d. late

54. See in particular the Judeo-Arabic documents cited in Mordechai A. Friedman, Divorce
Upon the Wife’s Demand as Reflected in Manuscripts From the Cairo Geniza, 4 JEWISH L. ANN. 103 (1981).
I concur with Friedman, who notes that “[a] more likely Jewish source for the ransom-divorce may be
seen in that practice usually referred to as the Gaonic enactment concerning the moredet, the
recalcitrant wife. According to most traditions, this usage, instituted in Babylonia in 650–651 BC,
empowered a wife who could not bear living with her husband to initiate divorce proceedings.”
Mordechai A. Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce: Divorce Proceedings Initiated by the Wife in Medieval Jewish
Practice, 6 ISR. ORIENTAL STUD. 288, 301 (1976) [hereinafter Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce]. Friedman
further contends, “The iftidā’ was clearly undertaken by the wife on her own initiative, as a result of
her unhappiness in the marriage. The wife had renounced her claims against her husband on
condition that he divorce her.” Id. at 296. Goitein concurred with Friedman and explained that the
Arabic term for release (barāʾa) sometimes referred to the divorce decree. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at
267–68.
55. PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Ketubbot 5:1, supra note 30.
56. As will become clear, I challenge the view that this geonic practice “deviated” from
Talmudic practice and argue that it should be understood as a customary practice, rather than an
“innovative” enactment. Libson suggests that this Geonic taqqanah might have been a custom. See
Gideon Libson, Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic Period: Taqqanah, Minhag, Tradition and Consensus: Some
Observations, in THE JEWS OF MEDIEVAL ISLAM: COMMUNITY, SOCIETY, AND IDENTITY 67, 72–74,
84–86 (Daniel Frank ed., 1995). However, Libson also claims:
There is ample evidence, for example, of women in the category known as ‘rebellious wife’
(ishah moredet) appealing to Muslim courts in order to circumvent Jewish law, which would
not readily grant them a divorce; in such cases the geonim felt it necessary to deviate from
talmudic law, in order to keep such women in the frame of Jewish courts . . . . Thus, the
geonim created a takkanah (enactment) that a ‘rebellious wife’ could obtain a divorce
immediately, rather than wait the extensive time required by rabbinic law, without
forfeiting the statutory value of her ketubbah (marriage contract).
GIDEON LIBSON, JEWISH AND ISLAMIC LAW, A COMPARATIVE REVIEW 265, § 11 (2007); see also 2
MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 658–65 (Bernard Auerbach &
Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994) (discussing the Geonic decree on the recalcitrant wife); RISKIN, supra
note 25, at 56.
57. Friedman explains that “[a]s far as the Geonim were concerned the fact that a wife could
demand a divorce from her husband was not a new element introduced by the enactment.” 1
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324. Elsewhere, Friedman clarifies:
It would seem most likely that the practice which is referred to in our sources as iftidā’ and
by Saadiah as xulʿ (ixtilāʿ) was nothing but the then accepted procedure for the recalcitrant
wife, familiar to us from the Gaonic responsa. The wife’s power to initiate divorce
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eighth century, Iraq) notes that only a rabbinic court’s coercion of a husband is a
valid means of compelling a husband to divorce his wife.58 Rabbi Isaac Alfasi (d.
1103 CE, Maghreb), in his Ṣefer ha-halkhot, written while he was living in Morocco,
accepts the Geonic practice (of coercing a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife),
but suggests that it is not based on talmudic practice.59 Rabbi Ḥananel ben
Ḥushiel (d. 1053 CE, Tunisia), however, appears to have understood the Geonic
decree as permitting a court order that the husband pay the dower, but not that he
deliver a divorce document.60
To summarize, Geonic divorce practices included:
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays her dower.61
(2) A rabbinic court compels a husband to divorce his wife and pay the
dower because the husband:62
(a) has physical defects;
(b) imposes unreasonable restrictions or behavior;
(c) is sterile or impotent;
(d) or works in a profession considered disgusting.
(3) A husband divorces his wife and does not pay the dower because the
court has declared the wife to be recalcitrant (i.e., a moredet or in breach
of contract) or because the wife:
(a) apostatized, ignored a Jewish precept, or acted immorally;
(b) refused sexual relations with her husband or performance of “wifely
duties”;

proceedings was thus recognized as standard procedure; and it was not necessary to write a
special stipulation in the marriage contract, as was the Palestinian practice.
Friedman, The Ransom-Divorce, supra note 54, at 302.
58. He is known as Yehudai Gaon. YEHUDAI BEN NAHMAN (D. LATE 8TH CENTURY; IRAQ),
SEFER HALAKHOT PESUKOT 342 (Solomon David Sassoon & Neil Danzig eds., 1998) (explaining
that it is valid for a non-rabbinic court to coerce a Jewish husband to divorce his wife if a rabbinic
court authorizes the coercion).
59. Rabbi Isaac Alfasi is known as the Rif. Westreich notes that
R. Isaac Alfasi, active in the second half of the eleventh century, was the most prominent
halakhist in Spain after the geonic period. In his treatise, Ṣefer Ha-Halakhot, widespread
throughout Spain (where he took refuge late in his life), he explicitly states that the ruling
coercing the husband to divorce his rebellious wife originates in the geonic ordinance
rather than in the Talmud itself.
Westreich, supra note 3, at 209–10. According to Friedman, “[a]lthough a number of the Gaonic responsa
specify that the husband is compelled to issue a divorce some medieval authorities who based themselves
exclusively on Alfasi interpreted the Gaonic enactment as if the husband’s consent were required.” 1
FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324.
60. Michael S. Berger, Maimonides on Sex and Marriage, in MARRIAGE, SEX, AND FAMILY IN
JUDAISM 149, 155–56 (Michael J. Broyde & Michael Ausubel eds., 2005).
61. But note that Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028 CE, Germany) “enacted a decree which made it
impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her will.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii.
62. These grounds for compelling a husband to divorce his wife are discussed in Geonic
responsa. See, e.g., ALBERT HARKAVY, TESHUVOT HA-GEONIM: SHEELOT U-TESHUVOT § 451
(Menorah, Makhon Le-Mehkar Ule-Hotsaat Kitve-Yad U-Sefarim ‘Atikim 1959) (1887).
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(c) or has blemishes or physical defects that impinge the marital
relationship.
(4) A wife divorces her husband, receiving either her full dower or part of it
and without waiting twelve months. In practice, it is unclear if the wife
actually received the dower or relinquished it.63
The final category was explicitly practiced in the Geonic period, but it is
unclear precisely who (husband or court) delivered the divorce decree.64 Since
there is limited surviving historical evidence, we cannot be certain which divorce
types were most prevalent.
C. Era of the Rishonim (1050–1400 CE )
In the post-Geonic era, the Rishonim (roughly, medieval rabbis) further
elaborated rabbinic opinions on when a woman could be divorced from her
husband.65 Two subcategories in this period appear to have supplemented the
rabbinic “short list” of grounds that warrant a court ordering a husband to divorce
his wife: (1) the husband’s adultery66 and (2) the husband’s transgression of the
laws of Moses (or apostasy).67 A woman’s ability to initiate a divorce without
citing one of the grounds specified in the Babylonian Talmud became, during the
period of the Rishonim, an issue debated by jurists that generated a variety of
regional practices.68
Generally, the Rishonim debated a rabbinic court’s ability to coerce a
husband to divorce his recalcitrant wife by making conflicting assertions about the
so-called “origin” of the law: the Talmud or the Geonic decree. Rashi (d. 1105 CE,
France) suggested that the Talmud was the source of the practice.69 His grandson
63. Goitein notes that the Genizah contains numerous documents indicating that Jewish
wives initiated divorce proceedings by renouncing their financial claims (i.e., their dowers) against
their husbands. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265.
64. As in the case of evidence of Jewish women divorcing in antiquity, the interpretation of
the historical record is obfuscated by an “orthodox” presumption that only husbandsnot rabbinic
courtscan deliver the divorce decree. But the evidence of substantive flexibility (i.e., Jewish wives
initiating divorces) insinuates some procedural flexibility (i.e., less formalism than the presumption
that only husbands may deliver divorce decrees). Moreover, Qaraites permitted judicial divorce
decrees. See infra text accompanying note 160. In addition, it is unclear if Islamic courts only coerced
Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees or if they also provided judicial divorce decrees. Goitein
mentions Genizah evidence of a Jewish woman who went to a Muslim judge to divorce her husband
against his will; the judge may have issued the divorce decree. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265.
65.
Elaboration of Talmudic discussions include: (a) refusal or inability to provide wife
sufficient maintenance, JOSEPH BEN EPHRAIM KARO (D. 1575; SPAIN), SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even
Haʿezer, Ketubbot 70:3 (1563); (b) refusal of conjugal rights, id. at Even Haʿezer, Ketubbot 76:11; (c)
husband’s inability to provide maintenance or sex, id. at Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:3; (d) husband is
compelled to divorce his wife if he engages in a disgusting profession, id. at Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:1.
66. Id.
67. See also KARO, SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:1.
68. For a thorough discussion of the medieval debates on the recalcitrant wife doctrine, see
Westeich, supra note 3.
69. Rashi (d. 1105; France) offers the following gloss of Ketubbot 63b: “One who says ‘I want
him’we should force her by reducing her ketubbah. But if she said ‘he is repulsive to me’I do not want
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(Rashbam, d. 1158 CE, France) upheld the decree by ruling that a husband should
be coerced to divorce his recalcitrant wife.70 However, Rashbam’s brother,
Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171 CE, France) rejected the Geonic decree of coercing the
husband to divorce his wife and effectively claimed that the Geonic practice was
unorthodox.71
In comparison, Maimonides (d. 1204 CE, Andalusia/Egypt) criticized, but
did not entirely reject, Geonic practices pertaining to a wife’s ability to demand a
divorce as a recalcitrant wife (moredet).72 Viewing the Geonic decree as based on
Talmudic practice, Maimonides differentiated between two types of recalcitrant
wives: (a) one who “loathes” her husband must forfeit her dower in order for the
husband to “be compelled to divorce her immediately”73 and (b) one who “rebels
against her husband merely in order to torment him” becomes the subject of a
daily public announcement threatening the forfeiture of her dower if she persists
in her recalcitrance;74 if she persists, then she is prohibited from receiving
maintenance (i.e., alimony) for twelve months, when she finally receives her

either him or his ketubbah. No pressure is placed on her  to delay her, but rather he gives her a divorce
document and she is divorced without a ketubbah.” Id. at 212 (citing RASHI, Ketubbot 63b).
70. Id. at 212 (citing RASHBAM IN TUR, Even Haʿezer, ch. 77).
71. In ṢEFER HA-YASHAR, Responsa § 24, Rabbeinu Tam (d. 1171; France) explains:
The Geonim decreed that we do not delay her 12 months for a divorce document, but
rather we coerce him (to give it). Heaven forbid that our rabbis should increase the
mamzerim (bastards) in Israel, for we established that Ravina and Rav Ashi were the end
of the “instruction.” And granted that the Geonim were able to establish that the ketubbah
of a woman could be collected on movable property [whereas in Talmudic times it was
only collectable on immovable property], based on halakhah or their own opinion, that is a
monetary issue. But to permit an invalid divorce document, we do not have the authority
from the days of Rav Ashi to the days of the messiah.
RISKIN, supra note 25, at 98–99. See also Westreich, supra note 3, at 212 (citing Ṣefer ha-yashar,
RESPONSA § 24 and TOSAFOT, Ketubbot 63b). Riskin offers a theory about Rabbeinu Tam’s influence:
Insisting that there was no Talmudic precedent for coercing a husband to divorce his wife
on the basis of her subjective claim that he was repulsive to her, he rejected the earlier
Gaonic decrees. So overwhelming was his personality, and so cogent his legal reasoning,
that his ruling influenced all subsequent halakhic authorities. From his time onward, the
tide turned in the other direction, and the position of earlier authorities such as Alfasi and
Maimonides was rejected. To this day the law is such that a woman who finds her husband
distasteful has no legal recourse and must remain tied to a husband she abhors.
RISKIN, supra note 25, at xiii; see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 661–62 (explaining that Rabbeinu Tam
invalidated the authority of Geonim to enact divorce legislation); Westreich, supra note 3, at 212
(discussing Rabbeinu Tam’s influence).
72. In Hilkhot Ishut 14:14, Maimonides claims, “The Gaonim reported that in Babylonia they
have different customs pertaining to the recalcitrant wife, but those customs did not spread to the
majority of Israel and many great scholars in many places disagree with them. We ought to recognize
and to rule according to Talmudic law.” MAIMONIDES (D. 1204; ANDALUSIA/EGYPT), MISHNEH
TORAH Hilkhot Ishut 14:14, at 90.
73. In Hilkhot Ishut 14:8, Maimonides explicitly states that a woman is not held captive and
forced to have sex with her husband if she despises him. Id. Hilkhot Ishut 14:8, at 88–89.
74. Shai Secunda has pointed out to me that this practice of making a public announcement is
evident in Zoroastrian law, discussed in the Babylonian Talmud, and mentioned in the Palestinian
Talmud in reference to a Babylonian sage. Therefore, these public announcements were likely a
Babylonian practice shared by many groups in that region.
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divorce decree.75 A practical application of his legal opinions is evident in a
Maimonidean responsum, which makes clear that a woman who chooses to
divorce leaves without her dower and the husband is forced to divorce her.76
The debate among Rishonim about the legitimacy of the Geonic decree was
fundamentally related to broader questions of juristic authority.77 Rashba (d. 1310
CE, France) accepted Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion that the Geonic practice was not
based on the Talmud, but did not describe it as legally invalid.78 Rabbeinu Asher
(d. 1327 CE, Germany/Toledo) opposed the Geonic decree on the grounds that it
was not accepted by a majority of Jews and that social circumstances had changed
since its enactment.79 By the early fourteenth century, a perspective of the Western
Rishonim that the Geonic decree was invalid began to dominate. By the sixteenth
century, a major Jewish law code acknowledged a rabbinic court’s ability to

75. MAIMONIDES, supra note 72, Hilkhot Ishut 14:9-13, at 89–90.
76. Responsum 34. A translation and discussion of this responsum is available in Reneé
Levine Melammed, He Said, She Said: A Woman Teacher in Twelfth-Century Cairo, 22 ASS’N FOR JEWISH
STUD. REV. 19, 27 (1997).
77. This is evident in many rabbinic texts and appears explicitly in Rabbi Yitzhak Ben Moshe.
See YITZHAK BEN MOSHE (d. 1250; Vienna), ṢEFER OR ZARUʿA, § 1, responsa 4354:
The Geonim of the yeshivas of Babylonia, our Savoraic rabbis who were after the
‘instruction,’ decreed that they coerce a husband to give a divorce document to a
recalcitrant wife immediately and also the Baʿal of Halakhot Gedolot wrote and also Rav
Hai and Rav Sherira wrote and all the Geonim, that for more than 300 years from their
days this decree was decreed and there is no deviation from this. And thus also Rav Alfasi
wrote his legal opinion and there is no one who can uproot the decree of the great bet din
of Babylonia. Therefore, this divorce document is legitimate and there is no questioning it.
And, moreoever, she has a strong claim that he cannot have sex with her and since he
agreed to give her a divorce document even though by coercion, then his divorce is valid.
For we have here a commandment to obey the words of the sages, the decree of the great
bet din . . . .
78. In RESPONSA, part 2, section 276, Rashba (d. 1310, Spain) states, “Nevertheless, if it is
their custom in those places to do as Maimonides, let them. Because even Geonim, you know they
said: we coerce (him) to divorce (her) as long as she is recalcitrant. And in the places where they
follow that tradition, we have no authority to disagree with them or to void their words.” See also
Westreich, supra note 3, at 213–14. Rashba claims that “[i]t is now fitting to be very cautious about
this issue, and not to act in accordance with this [Geonic] decree at all, for it has already been nullified
because of the generation.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at 119.
79. Rabbeinu Asher is known as the Rosh. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 126–27 (citing the Rosh’s
claims that the Geonic decree was for a particular generation and that Rabbeinu Gershom represented
uninterruped rabbinic tradition); see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 662–65. The Rosh’s son, Jacob ben
Asher (d. ca. 1349; Spain; also known as the Ṭur), is the author of an important code of Jewish law. In
Even Haʿezer, marriage laws, section 77, the Ṭur notes:
The woman who refuses her husband sex there are many decrees enacted on the
subject . . . . We saw a Geonic (text) that states to give her (the recalcitrant wife) her
essential ketubbah of 100 or 200 so that the daughters of Israel do not become illicit (i.e.,
engage in immoral sexual behavior) . . . . The Rosh, according to the words of Rav Alfasi,
said that when they saw the denigration among the daughters of Israel and that if they
waited 12 months for a divorce document they would rely upon idol-worshippers and go
out to evil culture . . . . The sages of Ashkenaz and Sefard agreed that in the case of ‘he is
repulsive to me’ it is not permissible to coerce the husband to divorce so every judge
should be careful not to coerce a divorce in the case of ‘he is repulsive to me.’ And also
they do not coerce her to be with him . . . .
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compel a divorce, but in situations of the husband’s unwillingness to support his
wife.80
It may be possible to differentiate the legal practices of the “East” (including
Babylonia and North Africa) from the legal practices of the “West” (including
primarily Europe). Jewish communities in the East continued to coerce husbands
to divorce their wives, as documented by Genizah evidence.81 The perspective of
Western rabbinic authorities appears to have arrived in the East at the end of the
fourteenth century when two rabbinic jurists (Ribash and Rashbatz) moved from
the southern regions of modern-day Spain to North Africa and prohibited
coercion of a husband to divorce a recalcitrant wife.82
This condensed chronology of Jewish women’s access to divorce indicates
that a prevalent Eastern practice of rabbinic courts coercing husbands to divorce
“recalcitrant” wives was gradually abolished by Western Rishonim (late medieval
rabbis) as a result of its characterization as unorthodox.83 Rather than resolve the
debate about the orthodoxy (or lack thereof) of the Geonic decree, I want to turn
to the Islamic chronology, which may elucidate some of the confusion in the
authority issues of the Judaic chronology.
III. AN ISLAMIC CHRONOLOGY OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE84
A. Legal Circles (610–750 CE )
Muslim women’s divorce options in the earliest decades of Islamic history
cannot be easily reconstructed, but some historical texts can illuminate the orally
transmitted traditions of the late antique period.85 Most of the Qurʾ ānic verses
dealing with the subject of divorce are addressed to men and discuss the post-

80. KARO (D. 1575; SPAIN), SHŪLHAN ʿARŪKH, Even Haʿezer, Gīṭṭīn 154:3.
81. See the Taylor-Schechter Cairo Genizah Collection at Cambridge University Library,
Additional Series 146 4 (requiring by court order a husband to write a divorce decree for his wife in
Egypt, ca. 1240); id. at New Series J 455 (forcing a husband to give his wife a divorce decree).
82. Ribash is Rabbi Isaac Bar Sheshet (d. 1408, Spain/Algiers) and Rashbatzh (also Tashbatz)
is Simeon ben Zemah Duran (d. 1444, Spain/Algiers). Westreich, supra note 3, at 216–17.
83. How to interpret the historical evidence of Jewish women initiating divorces is the crucial
issue here. Friedman summarized that “during a millennium and a half it was stipulated in ketubbot
and rabbis eventually recognized as binding that through the wife’s initiative, if she found life with her
husband unbearable, the court would take action to terminate the marriage.” Friedman, supra note 22,
at 27.
84. The periodization used in this section is my own and is not standard in the field of Islamic
legal studies. I elaborate this periodization in Lena Salaymeh, Islamic Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (James D. Wright ed., forthcoming 2015).
85. Two of the earliest surviving compilations of reports (muṣ a nnafāt) are of al-Ṣanʿānī (d.
827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849). In this section, I will focus on these sources for historical
information about the mid-seventh to mid-eighth centuries because these texts are less entangled in
particular juristic outcomes than other collections. See ʿABD AL-MAJĪD MAHMŪD ʿABD AL-MAJĪD,
AL-ITTIJĀHĀT AL-FIQHĪYAH ʿINDA ẠSHĀB AL-HADĪTH FĪ AL-QARN AL-THĀLITH AL-HIJRĪ
(Maktabat al-Khānjī 1979). On the reliability of these sources, see HARALD MOTZKI, HADĪTH:
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS (2004).
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divorce waiting period and alimony.86 But one key verse declares: “if you fear that
they (the couple) cannot maintain God’s limits, then it will not be held against
them (the couple) if she (the wife) forfeits something.”87 Major exegetical texts
and other historical sources interpret this verse as relating to an actual incident in
which the Prophet approved a woman returning her dower (mahr) to effect a
divorce.88 In all versions of this narrative, the wife returns the entire dower she
had received from her husband and the Prophet approves her action. Most late
antique Muslim traditionists interpreted the narrative as limiting the amount a
woman forfeits to the amount she received as dower, since there are no Prophetic
reports permitting a husband to take more than the dower.89 But jurists did not
restrict this form of divorce to judicial intervention.90 Most versions of the
narrative describe the event without indicating that the woman was at fault, but
rather that she found her husband intolerable.91 Yet there are other variations of
this narrative that imply distinct conditions surrounding this particular woman’s
forfeiture divorce (khulʿ ): she was abused;92 she was recalcitrant;93 or her husband
consented to the divorce settlement.94 In discussing a woman’s potential fault,
86. Relevant verses include Qurʾān 2:228–32, 2:236–37, 2:241, 65:1–7, 4:35.
87. Id. at 2:229. The verse is commonly understood as referring to khulʿ.
88. This is a narrative about a woman named Habībah who initiates and affects a divorce by
returning her dower to her husband. 6 ʿABD AL-RAZZĀQ IBN HAMMĀM AL-HIMYARĪ AL-SANʿĀNĪ (D.
827; YEMEN), MUSANNAF FĪ AL-HADĪTH 482–503 (Habīb al-Raḥmān al-ʿẠzamī ed., 1970). The same
narrative is reported by numerous other traditionists, not cited here, including Mālik (d. 796), Bukhārī
(d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Dārimī (d. 869), Ibn Mājah (d. 887), Abū Dāwūd (d. 889), and al-Tirmidhī
(d. 892). In some versions of the narrative, the woman is identified as Jamīlah and in other versions
her name is not used.
89. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 501–06 (indicating that in the majority of reports a
husband may not take more than dower in khulʿ divorce); 4 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN ABĪ
SHAYBAH (D. 849; IRAQ), AL-KITĀB AL-MUSANNAF FĪ AL-AHĀDĪTH WA-AL-ĀTHĀR 128–29
(Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Salām Shāhīn ed., 1995) (indicating that in the majority of reports a husband
may not take more than dower in khulʿ divorce).
90. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 494–95 (indicating that in the majority of reports, khulʿ is
permissible without court intervention); 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, MUSANNAF, supra note 89, at 124–25
(indicating that in the majority of reports khulʿ is permissible without court intervention);
MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN 162–63 (Jāmiʿat Umm
al-Qurá, Kullīyat Al-Sharīʿah Wa-Al-Dirāsāt Al-Islāmīyah, Markaz Al-Baḥth Al-ʿIlmī Wa-Iḥyāʾ eds.,
1983) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN] (suggesting that khulʿ is permissible without a
judge). But see 1 MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ 386 (1989)
[hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ] (suggesting that khulʿ is not permissible without court
intervention).
91. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 483; MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH
ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ TĀLIB 246 (1983) (asserting that khulʿ is permissible if wife states that she finds husband
intolerable).
92. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 482–84.
93. Id. at 495–98 (indicating that in the majority of reports, the husband can only accept
payment from wife if she finds him intolerable or she is recalcitrant); IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note
89, at 120–21 (suggesting that a wife’s recalcitrance is a condition for forfeiture divorce); QALʿAH’JĪ,
supra note 91, at 246 (explaining that khulʿ is permissible if wife is recalcitrant). Some reports limit the
forfeiture divorce to a wife who committed a grave sin (such as adultery).
94. The implication of consent is that this divorce was not unilaterally imposed on the
husband by the Prophet. AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 502–03.
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some jurists were concerned with preventing an injustice prohibited in the Qurʾān:
a woman relinquishing her dower right without cause in order to divorce her
husband.95 Late antique jurists ruled that if a husband abuses his wife in order to
pressure her to pursue a forfeiture divorce, then that divorce is void and the wife
receives her full dower.96 In addition, there seems to have been some ambiguity as
to the status of a forfeiture divorce: was it a revocable divorce, an irrevocable
divorce, or a rescission?97 Most late antique jurists ruled that a forfeiture divorce is
irrevocable or that it is a rescission.98
That this wife-initiated divorce was historically practiced is corroborated by a
report that ʿ Umar (d. 644), the second caliph, condemned criticism of women
who demanded a divorce by forfeiting their dowers.99 (This type of criticism is
apparent in reports that women who pursue forfeiture divorces are morally
compromised.100) There were four basic late antique Islamic divorce practices:
(1) The most frequently discussed situation is of a husband divorcing his
wife and paying a divorce settlement.101 According to some jurists, he
could avoid paying the post-divorce alimony if she was deemed
recalcitrant.102
(2) A husband offers his wife the option of choosing divorce or staying
95. The Qurʾānic verse is 4:19 (“[D]o not compel them (women) to give away part of what you
have given them unless they commit an obvious sin.”).
96. MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH SUFYĀN AL-THAWRĪ 378 (1990)
(explaining that khulʿ is void under duress of husband’s abuse and husband must return dower).
97. There are two basic categories of divorce: (1) ṭalāq rajʿī is a revocable divorce in which the
couple can reconcile under the terms of the original marriage contract during a specified waiting
period; (2) ṭalāq bāʾin is an irrevocable divorce that necessitates a new marriage contract. The sources
indicate that khulʿ was inconsistently described as divorce (conflictingly specified as irrevocable or
revocable) or faskh (rescission or voiding of the marriage contract). AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at
480–82; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 113, 121–23 (providing conflicting opinions on the
revocability of a forfeiture divorce).
98. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 247 (classifying khulʿ as an irrevocable divorce); MUHAMMAD
RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ 268 (Jāmiʿat Al-Kuwayt ed.,
2001) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ] (classifying khulʿ as an irrevocable
divorce); MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿUMAR: ʿASRUHU
WA-HAYĀTUH 324 (1986) (providing conflicting reports on khulʿ as divorce or recission); QALʿAH’JĪ,
supra note 96, at 378–79 (classifying khulʿ as irrevocable divorce); MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ,
MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS 313–34 (1996) [hereinafter QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN
ʿABBĀS] (classifying khulʿ as recission); 1 QALʿAH’JĪ, AL-HASAN AL-BASRĪ, supra note 90, at 386–87
(classifying khulʿ as irrevocable divorce).
99. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 201; 4 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN ABĪ
SHAYBAH, MUSANNAF FĪ AL-AHĀDĪTH WA-AL-ĀTHĀR 185 (Saʻīd Laḥḥām ed., 1989) (condemning
criticism of women who seek khulʿ divorces); QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUMAR IBN ʿABD AL-ʿAZĪZ, supra note 98,
at 268 (claiming that khulʿ divorce is permitted where wife finds her husband intolerable); see also 11
AHMAD IBN AL-HUSAYN AL-BAYHAQĪ (D. 1066; KHURASAN), AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA 182 (1996)
(condemning criticism of women who seek khulʿ divorces).
100. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 201.
101. Id. at Kitāb Al-Talāq passim; 6 MUHAMMAD IBN IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʿĪ (D. 820;
ARABIA/EGYPT), AL-UMM passim (2001).
102. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 780–81 (stating that a recalcitrant wife does not receive postdivorce alimony and making no mention of dower reduction or loss).
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with him; if she chooses divorce, he pays her the full divorce
settlement.103
(3) A wife divorces her husband and she pays some form of divorce
settlement by relinquishing part or all of her dower.104
(4) A court divorces a couple because the husband is unable to provide his
wife with sufficient maintenance,105 is missing,106 or is impotent.107
This historical evidence unambiguously records a wife’s ability to initiate and
to effect a divorce (khul ʿ ) in seventh-century Arabia, but the conditions
surrounding a wife’s divorce option were imprecise. There seems to have been a
gendered aspect to the legal terminology used by jurists in this period.108
B. Professionalization of Legal Schools (800–1050 CE)
Professional jurists replaced the imprecision surrounding wife-initiated
divorce with elaborate juridical categories. In comparison to earlier ḥadīth
collections (muṣannafāt), slightly later, canonical compilations reduce the number of

103. This is based on a Prophetic precedent. YAʿQŪB IBN IBRĀHĪM AL-ANSĀRĪ AL-KŪFĪ ABŪ
YŪSUF (D. 798; IRAQ), KITĀB AL-ĀTHĀR 139–41 (1978); 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 515–26; 7
Id. at 8–15; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 92–94; 1 MUHAMMAD IBN YAZĪD IBN MĀJAH (D.
887; IRAN), SUNAN AL-MUSTAFÁ 632 (Abī Al-Hasan Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbd Al-Hādī Al-Sindī Hanafī
ed., 1975) [hereinafter IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN AL-MUSTAFÁ] (reporting that the Prophet offered his
wives a divorce option); 1 IBN MĀJAH (D. 887; IRAN), SUNAN ABĪ ʿABD ALLĀH MUHAMMAD IBN
YAZĪD AL-QAZWĪNĪ IBN MĀJAH 661–62 (MUHAMMAD FUĀ
ʾ D ʿABD AL-BĀQĪ ed., 1952–54)
[hereinafter IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN IBN MĀJAH] (reporting that the Prophet gave wives the option to
divorce and receive full dower). The following late antique jurists validated giving a wife the option to
divorce without relinquishing her dower: QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 440–43; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN
IBN ʿAFFĀN, supra note 90, at 257; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿUMAR, supra note 98, at 562–64;
MUHAMMAD RAWWĀS QALʿAH’JĪ, MAWSŪʿAT FIQH ZAYD IBN THĀBIT WA-ABĪ HURAYRAH 197–98
(1993); QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 614–16; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at
510.
104. 6 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 490–91, 494–95, 500–06; 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra
note 89, at 120–23, 128–29; QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿAFFĀN, supra note 90, at 162 (indicating that
the first four caliphs all permitted khulʿ divorce); see also 7 MUHAMMAD IBN ISMĀʿĪL BUKHĀRĪ (D.
870; KHURĀSĀN), SAHĪH AL-BUKHĀRĪ [THE TRANSLATION OF THE MEANINGS OF SAHIH ALBUKHĀRĪ, ARABIC-ENGLISH] 149–51 (Muhammad Muhsin Khan trans., 1981); ʿALĪ IBN JAʿFAR
MADANĪ (D. 825), MASĀIʾL ʿALĪ IBN JAʿFAR WA-MUSTADRAKĀTUHĀ 283 (1990) (Imāmī Shīʿī: a
woman relinquishes any monetary claims against the husband in wife-initiated divorce). (There was a
minority opinion that prohibited forfeiture divorces and another minority opinion that only permitted
them with judicial intervention; but neither of these positions was normative. ʿABLAH KAHLĀWĪ, ALKHULʿ: DAWĀʾMĀ LĀ DAWĀʾLA-HU: DIRĀSAH FIQHĪYAH MUQĀRANAH 68–69 (2000).)
105. 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 174–75; QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 456
(indicating a judge may issue a divorce if the husband is unable or unwilling to provide maintenance).
But see QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 96, at 781 (indicating a judge does not divorce a couple if the husband is
unable to provide sufficient maintenance for the wife).
106. QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at 520 (indicating a judge may issue
a divorce with sufficient grounds, such as abandonment).
107. QALʿAH’JĪ, supra note 91, at 454–55 (indicating that a divorce is granted if husband is
impotent or cannot provide the wife with conjugal rights).
108. QALʿAH’JĪ, ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABBĀS, supra note 98, at 312, 510 (indicating that in khulʿ
the wife pays for separation, whereas ṭalāq is husband’s option).
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reports about wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ ) and limit these divorces to situations
where a wife has “sufficient” grounds.109 There were conflicting opinions about
what constituted reasonable justification for a wife to pursue a divorce, with some
jurists identifying her expressed statement of abhorrence as sufficient.110 Yet most
Muslim jurists interpreted the narratives about the Prophetic precedent permitting
wife-initiated divorce111 as including a requirement of the husband’s consent112 or
as being prompted by a situation of abuse.113 Many legal texts of this period also

109. I compared the muṣannafāt of al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 827) and Ibn Abī Shaybah (d. 849) to Scott
Lucas’s schematic study of the texts of Bukhārī (d. 870), Muslim (d. 875), Dārimī (d. 869), Ibn Mājah
(d. 887), Abū Dāw ūd (d. 889), and al-Tirmidhī (d. 892). The later texts have fewer reports about khulʿ
and suggest the necessity of “sufficient” grounds (such as spousal abuse or a husband’s consent) that
were not explicit in earlier texts. Scott C. Lucas, Divorce, Hadīth-Scholar Style: From Al-Dārimī to AlTirmidhī, 19 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 325, 368 (2008). Later sources include more versions implying that it is
wrong for a woman to demand a divorce without sufficient “justification.” 1 IBN MĀJAH (D. 887;
IRAN), SUNAN IBN MĀJAH, supra note 103, at 662 (suggesting that a woman who demands a divorce
without grounds will be punished in the hereafter); see also 2 MUHAMMAD IBN ʿĪSÁ TIRMIDHĪ (D. 892;
KHURĀSĀN), SUNAN AL-TIRMIDHĪ WA-HUWA AL-JĀMIʿ AL-SAHĪH 429–30 (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd
al-Laṭīf & ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Muḥammad ʿUthmān eds., 1965) (including narratives about the evils of a
woman demanding a divorce without sufficient justification).
110. See supra text accompanying note 91. Some canonical Sunnī texts seem to have
understood a wife’s disgust for her husband as sufficient grounds. See, e.g., 1 IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN IBN
MĀJAH, supra note 103, at 663 (implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her husband was
repulsive). Note that Imāmī Shīʿī sources make the wife’s explicit statement of disgust for her
husband incumbent in a khulʿ divorce. 7 MUHAMMAD IBN AL-HASAN ḤURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ (D. 1693;
LEBANON/IRAN), WASĀIʾL AL-SHĪʿAH ILA TAHSĪL MASĀIʾL AL-SHARĪʿAH 487–89 (Imāmī Shīʿī)
(ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Rabbānī, et al. eds., 1956). This resembles the rabbinic discussions of a wife who
seeks a divorce because her husband is repulsive. See supra text accompanying notes 69, 73, 79.
111. Supra text accompanying note 88.
112. Most versions of the narrative suggest that the husband was not consulted, but rather
that the Prophet simply agreed to the woman’s (Ḥabībah’s) suggestion of giving back the garden she
had received as her dower and the husband, upon learning of the Prophet’s approval, acquiesced.
Supra text accompanying note 94. This is a key procedural issue, since a husband’s unilateral
prerogative to effect the divorce is not substantiated by all versions of this narrative. Specific
examples include the following: 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, supra note 101, at 500, no. 2503 & no. 2504 (providing
no mention of spousal abuse or husband’s consent); 3 AHMAD IBN SHUʿAYB NASĀĪʾ (D. 915;
EGYPT/SYRIA), KITĀB AL-SUNAN AL-KUBRA 369 (ʿAbd al-Ghaffār Sulaymān Bindārī & Sayyid
Kasrawī Hasan eds., 1991) (giving no indication of abuse or husband’s consent in narrative). Bājī
includes the narrative about Ḥabībah without stipulating the husband’s consent and includes a
narrative about a woman who divorced (ikhtalʿat, feminine form of the verb khulʿ ) her husband. 5
SULAYMĀN IBN KHALAF BĀJĪ (D. 1081; ANDALUSIA), AL-MUNTAQA: SHARH MUWATTAʾ MĀLIK
295–300 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā ed., 1999). Arabi has also observed that the Ḥabībah
narrative in the canonical text of al-Bukhārī does not indicate the husband’s permission was necessary
for wife-initiated divorce. Arabi, supra note 4, at 20.
113. There are several different versions of this narrative. See supra text accompanying notes
92–94. The version that includes abuse becomes more dominant in a later period. While Dārimī, Ibn
Mājah, Abū Dāwūd, and al-Tirmidhī include a category of reports preventing a woman from seeking
to divorce a non-abusive husband, the other texts (i.e., Bukhārī and Muslim) do not. See Lucas, supra
note 109, at 368. By way of illustration, Nasāʾī (d. 915) and Ṭabarānī (d. 971) narrate the Prophetic
story about the woman divorcing her husband and returning her dower (which is narrated in earlier
collections), but add that the husband was abusive (which does not appear in earlier collections).
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 63; see also 2 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN DĀRIMĪ (D. 869;
SAMARQAND), SUNAN AL-DĀRIMĪ 162 (Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Khālidī ed., 1996) (claiming that
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closely associated with wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ ) and recalcitrant wives, which
was less evident in earlier texts.114 Consequently, the legal possibility that seems to
prevail in this period is a husband’s option to divorce his wife and not pay the full
dower if she is considered recalcitrant (nāshizah).115 This juristic elaboration of the
forfeiture divorce is remarkable because the legal option of husbands paying less
than the divorce settlement is not substantiated by a Prophetic legal precedent.116
Instead, it appears to have been elaborated by Muslim jurists in this period.
Whereas earlier texts included women’s voices, in later texts it is primarily
men enacting forfeiture divorce.117 Thus, whereas khulʿ seemed to have simply
been the term used for wife-initiated divorce in an earlier period, it became a term
used for divorce situations in which the husband paid less than the full divorce
settlement.118 This coincided with what appears to be a slight change in the dower

Ḥabībah’s husband was abusive); 1 SULAYMĀN IBN AL-ASHʿATH AL-SIJISTĀNĪ ABŪ DĀWŪD (D. 889;
IRAQ), SUNAN ABĪ DĀWŪD 462 (Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Hamīd ed., 1970) (providing
different narratives in which Ḥabībah’s husband was or was not abusive); 4 Id. at 310–11 (providing
different narratives in which Ḥabībah’s husband was or was not abusive); 2 ABŪ JAʿFAR MUHAMMAD
IBN JARĪR AL-TABARĪ (D. 923; IRAQ), JĀMIʿ AL-BAYĀN ʿAN TAʾWIL
̄ ĀY AL-QURĀ
ʾ N 276 (providing a
narrative about Ḥabībah that includes spousal abuse) (1986–87); 2 ABŪ ISHĀQ IBRĀHĪM IBN ʿALĪ IBN
YŪSUF FĪRŪZĀBAD
̄ Ī AL-SHĪRĀZĪ (D. 1083; IRAN), AL-MUHADHDHAB FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-SHĀFIʿĪ
71–72 (1959) (Shāfiʿī: narrating that she pursued a khulʿ divorce because her husband was abusive).
114. Again, this is based on my comparison of muṣannafāt to later collections. See the
beginning of the section on khulʿ in 2 ʿABD AL-SALĀM IBN SAʿĪD SAHNŪN (D. 854; TUNISIA) ET AL.,
AL-MUDAWWANAH AL-KUBRA LI-IMĀM MĀLIK IBN ANAS AL-ASBAHĪ 241–51 (ʿĪsá ibn Masʿad
Zawāwī ed., 1994). Reports about a recalcitrant wife and wife-initiated divorce are juxtaposed in 6 ALSHĀFIʿĪ, supra note 101 (kitāb al-khulʿ wa al-nushūz ). The section on recalcitrance (nushūz ) appears
immediately before the section on wife-initiated divorce (khulʿ) in 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at
71–78 (Shāfiʿī: section on recalcitrance immediately precedes section on khulʿ). In a different edition:
2 ABŪ ISHĀQ IBRĀHĪM IBN ʿALĪ IBN YŪSUF FĪRŪZĀBĀDĪ AL-SHĪRĀZĪ (D. 1083; IRAN), ALMUHADHDHAB FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀM AL-SHĀFIʿĪ 486–99 (Zakarīyā ʿUmayrāt & Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad
Baṭṭāl eds., 1995). Some Muslim jurists viewed khulʿ as being only permissible in situations of
recalcitrance or loathing. KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 68.
115. See supra text accompanying note 93.
116. There are no references to this practice in biographical or historical texts; in addition, the
jurisprudential texts do not cite a Prophetic precedent. In other words, there is no indication in the
historical sources that a Muslim man in the Prophetic period could divorce a woman without paying
the full dower.
117. By “earlier” and “later,” I refer not only to the dating of specific texts, but also to the
dating of the materials in the texts. Later sources tend to introduce khulʿ in the feminine verbal form,
but then exclusively or primarily offer examples of men initiating this divorce. See, e.g., 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ,
supra note 101, at 502 (discussing khulʿ as a man’s prerogative). That many legal texts begin the section
on khulʿ by discussing a woman’s decision to divorce her husband suggests that women had some
autonomy in this matter. See, e.g., 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 489 (Shāfīʿī: section begins, “[I]f a
woman dislikes her husband . . . she may divorce him . . . ”). Yet, much of the subsequent discussions
in these texts focus on a husband verbalizing or effecting the divorce through his proclamation.
118. A husband can divorce through khulʿ and pay less than the full settlement if (a) wife is
recalcitrant; (b) wife commits a sin; (c) wife is disobedient. 4 ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN JAZĪRĪ ET AL., KITĀB
AL-FIQH ʿALA AL-MADHĀHIB AL-ARBAʿAH WA MADHHAB AHL AL-BAYT 472–73 (1998) (explaining
Mālikīs recommended khulʿ divorce of a recalcitrant wife and Ḥanbalis permitted khulʿ divorce of a
recalcitrant wife); see also ʿĀMIR SAʿĪD ZAYBĀRĪ, AHKĀM AL-KHULʿ FĪ AL-SHARĪʿAH AL-ISLĀMĪYAH
75–76 (1997).
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payment: previously, the wife received the full dower (i.e., consideration) at the
formation of the marriage contract, but gradually, most dowers were partially paid
at the contract formation and the remainder was recorded as a kind of debt the
husband’s estate owed the wife, due at divorce or at his death. This resulted in a
shift in the procedural mechanism by which a wife initiated divorce: no longer able
to simply return the dower that was given to her, she had to instead relinquish her
rights to an unpaid dower in a formal legal process. Regardless of the initiating
party (wife or husband), jurists debated the classification of khulʿ as a divorce or
rescission119 and the permissibility of a husband taking more than the dower.120
To summarize, by the end of the professionalization period, the following
divorce practices were recognized:
(1) A husband divorces his wife for whatever reason and pays the divorce
settlement in full.

119. See supra text accompanying note 98; ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN IBN ʿAMR AWZĀʿĪ (D. 774;
SYRIA), SUNAN AL-AWZĀʿĪ: AHĀDĪTH WA-ĀTHĀR WA-FATĀWÁ 338 (Marwān Muḥammad al-Shaʿʿār
ed., 1993) (Awzāʿī: khulʿ is a divorce); ABŪ YŪSUF, supra note 103, at 129 (Ḥanafī: a separation
initiated by the wife is irrevocable); 2 ʿABD ALLĀH IBN MUHAMMAD IBN BARAKAH (D. 10TH CENT;
ʿUMĀN), KITĀB AL-JĀMIʿ 196 (ʿĪsá Yaḥyá Bārūnī ed., 2nd ed. 1974) (Ibāḍī: khulʿ is a revocable
divorce); ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-RAHMĀN IBN ABĪ ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ (D. 996; TUNISIA), ALRISĀLAH AL-FIQHĪYAH 202, 205 (1986) (Mālikī: khulʿ is irrevocable); 2 ABŪ YAʿLA MUHAMMAD IBN
AL-HUSAYN IBN AL-FARRĀʾ (D. 1066; IRAQ), AL-MASĀIʾL AL-FIQHĪYAH MIN KITĀB AL-RIWĀYATAYN
WA-AL-WAJHAYN 136 (ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad Lāḥim ed., 1985) (Ḥanbalī: khulʿ dissolves
contracts); 6 MUHAMMAD IBN AHMAD SHAMS AL-DĪN SARAKHSĪ (D. 11TH CENT; TRANSOXANIA),
KITĀB AL-MABSŪT 171 (1993) (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable); 7 HURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ, supra note 110, at
495 (Imāmī Shīʿī: khulʿ is irrevocable). Note, there are conflicting opinions within each legal school.
See MUHAMMAD IBN NASR MARWAZĪ (D. 906; SAMARQAND), IKHTILĀF AL-FUQAHĀʾ 301–02
(Muḥammad Ṭāhir Ḥakīm ed., 2000) (summarizing the opinions of major jurists on the legal
implications of a khulʿ divorce). Irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bāʾin) is the opinion of many late antique
jurists, as well as Mālik and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (in one of two opinions attested to him); revocable
divorce (ṭalāq rajʿī) is the opinion of the Ẓāhirīs; rescission ( faskh) is the opinion of some late antique
jurists, as well as al-Shāfiʿī and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (in one of two opinions attested to him).
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 113–17 (summarizing which jurists or legal schools view khulʿ as
irrevocable divorce, revocable divorce, or rescission); see also ZAYBĀRĪ, supra note 118, at 221–23.
120. See supra text accompanying note 89. The possibility that a husband could take in excess
of the dower continued to be a subject of juristic debate. AWZĀʿĪ, supra note 119, at 338 (Awzāʿī: a
husband may not take more than the dower in a khulʿ divorce); MĀLIK IBN ANAS (D. 796; ARABIA),
MUWATTAʾAL-IMĀM MĀLIK 188–89 (ʿAbd al-Wahhāb ʿAbd al-Laṭīf ed., 2d ed. 1979) (explaining that
it is unfavorable, but permitted, for a husband to take more than dower in khulʿ); 6 AL-SHĀFIʿĪ, supra
note 101, at 501 (explaining that a husband may take more than dower); 1 IBN MĀJAH, SUNAN ALMUSTAFÁ, supra note 103, at 633 (explaining that a wife returns only her dower, not more, in khulʿ); 2
IBN BARAKAH, supra note 119, at 195 (Ibāḍī: it is not permissible for a husband to take more than the
dower in khulʿ); IBN ABĪ ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ, supra note 119, at 205 (Mālikī: a wife may offer her
dower, less, or more in khulʿ); 2 YŪSUF IBN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN ʿABD AL-BARR (D. 1070; ANDALUSIA),
KITĀB AL-KĀFĪ FĪ FIQH AHL AL-MADĪNAH AL-MĀLIKĪ 593 (Muḥammad Muḥammad Aḥīd Wuld
Mādīk Mūrītānī ed., 1980) (Mālikī: khulʿ is a wife losing entire dower and fidya is wife losing part of
dower); 7 HURR AL-ʿĀMILĪ, supra note 110, at 493 (Imāmī Shīʿī: husband may take more than dower
in khulʿ, but not in mubāraʾah).
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(2) A husband divorces his wife and pays less than the divorce settlement
under the category of khulʿ , possibly because the wife is recalcitrant or
immoral.121
(3) A court declares a wife divorced and the husband pays the divorce
settlement for the following reasons:
(a) if he is impotent or has a severe defect or disease;122
(b) if he deserts his wife, fails to provide her maintenance, or is cruel;123
(c) or if he is insane.124
(4) A wife divorces her husband125 and forfeits the divorce settlement
(dower) partially, completely, or even pays in excess under specific
circumstances.126 According to many jurists, the husband’s consent is
required.127
(5) Less prevalent than in an earlier period,128 a husband offers his wife the
121. Many late antique jurists and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal prohibit a husband from taking more
than the wife’s dower; Ḥanafīs do not recommend his taking more; Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Imāmī Shīʿīs
permit husbands to take as much as, less than, or more than the dower amount he gave her. The two
main juristic opinions (for and against a husband taking more than the dower in a khulʿ divorce) are
summarized in KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 140–43.
122. “An impotent husband must be allowed a year’s probation after which divorce takes
place” and the wife is entitled to keep the entire dower. 2 ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ BAKR MARGHĪNAN
̄ Ī (D. 1197;
FARGHĀNA), THE HIDAYA: COMMENTARY ON THE ISLAMIC LAWS 217 (Ḥanafī) (Zahra Baintner
trans., Darul Ishaat 2007). By the early modern period, Ḥanafī jurists had identified sexual impotence
as the only valid grounds for a woman to demand a divorce, but also permitted women to include
numerous stipulations in the marriage contract that would facilitate their divorce rights. See JAZĪRĪ ET
AL., supra note 118, at passim.
123. See supra text accompanying note 105; see also 17 ABĪ ZAKARĪYĀ MUHYĪ AL-DĪN IBN
SHARAF AL-NAWAWĪ (D. 1277; SYRIA) ET AL., AL-MAJMŪʿ, SHARH AL-MUHADHAB 110–12 (Zakarīyā
ʿAlī Yūsuf ed., 1966–69) (Shāfiʿī: if a husband cannot support his wife, they are divorced).
124. But there is a Ḥanafī opinion that a woman cannot demand judicial divorce if her
husband is mentally incompetent or has a serious disease. 2 MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 219
(Ḥanafī).
125. A wife can demand khulʿ if (a) wife finds husband disgusting (incompatibility); (b)
husband is abusive; (c) wife fears that she cannot be faithful. 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 171
(Ḥanafī: including a chapter on khulʿ that begins, “[I]f a woman divorces her husband . . . .”). Ibn
Ḥazm synopsizes juristic opinions by noting that some jurists prohibit khulʿ, while others make it
conditional upon one of the following factors: (a) a political leader permits it; (b) the wife is having an
affair; (c) the husband is abusive; (d) she refuses to purify herself; (e) she claims that her husband is
repulsive; (f) she dislikes him and he is not compelling her (to relinquish her dower). ʿALĪ IBN
AHMAD IBN HAZM (D. 1064; ANDALUSIA), MARĀTIB AL-IJMĀʿ FĪ AL-ʿIBĀDĀT WA-AL-MUʿĀMĀLAT
WA-AL-IʿTIQĀDĀT 74–75 (Ẓāhirī) (1970); see also 10 ʿALĪ IBN AHMAD IBN HAZM (D. 1064;
ANDALUSIA), AL-MUHALLĀ 286–97 (Ẓāhirī) (Ḥasan Zaydān Ṭulbah ed., 1967–71) [hereinafter IBN
HAZM), AL-MUHALLĀ].
126. See supra text accompanying note 121.
127. While all the legal schools accept the validity of khulʿ, most legal schools view it as a
negotiated settlement. 10 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note 125, at 286 (Ẓāhirī: khulʿ is only by
mutual consent). Ḥanafīs require the husband to accept the wife’s khulʿ offer in order for a divorce to
be valid. 4 JAZĪRĪ ET AL., supra note 118, at 494. This resembles the common—although likely not
universal—rabbinic perspective that a husband must deliver a get for a divorce to occur.
128. See supra text accompanying note 103. Earlier texts discuss this option more than later
texts.
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option of choosing divorce or staying with him; if she chooses divorce,
he pays her a divorce settlement.129
When compared to the previous period (of legal circles and networks), a
wife’s ability to initiate divorce was circumscribed.
C. Consolidation (1050–1400 CE)
By the eleventh century, Muslim jurists had elaborated more details
surrounding divorce practices.130 Jurists developed a taxonomy for divorce
settlements paid by a wife by trying to assign different terms for divorces in which
the wife loses the dower, or more or less than the dower.131 They also continued
129. IBN ANAS, supra note 120, at 191–92 (giving a wife a divorce option with full dower);
ABŪ YŪSUF, supra note 103, at 139–41 (Ḥanafī: women given choice to divorce and receive dowers); 2
BISHR IBN GHĀNIM AL-KHURĀSĀNĪ AL-IBĀDĪ (D. CA. 815; KHURĀSĀN), MUDAWWANAH AL-KUBRÁ
56–67 (Ibāḍī) (1984); 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 210–23 (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option with
full dower); 2 IBN ʿABD AL-BARR, supra note 120, at 587–91 (Mālikī: giving wife divorce option with
full dower). But see Ibn Ḥazm, negating the possibility of a woman being given the option of
choosing divorce. 10 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note 125, at 144–53 (Ẓāhirī).
130. Ibn Rushd summarizes these medieval juristic perspectives:
Five opinions are, thus, derived for khulʿ. First, that is not permitted at all. Second, it is
permitted in all circumstances, that is, even under duress. Third, it is not permitted unless
fornication is witnessed. Fourth, it is permitted when there is fear that the limits imposed
by Allāh will not be maintained. Fifth, that it is permitted in all circumstances, except
under duress, which is the most widely accepted (mashhūr) opinion.
2 IBN RUSHD, THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER: A TRANSLATION OF BIDĀYAT AL-MUJTAHID
81 (Imran Ashan Khan Nyazee trans., 1996). Duress here refers to a husband forcing his wife to
accept less than the divorce settlement.
131.
Jurists continued to debate the permissibility of a husband taking more than the
dower from the wife in khulʿ. Ibn Rushd summarizes this debate:
The term khulʿ, however, in the opinion of the jurists is confined to her paying him all that
he spent on her, the term ṣulḥ to paying a part of it, fidya to paying more than it, and
mubāraʾah to her writing off a claim that she had against him.
Id. at 79. Still, there is a difference of opinion on the possibility of a husband taking more than the
divorce settlement in fidya. See 2 ʿALĀʾ AL-DĪN MUHAMMAD IBN AḤMAD SAMARQANDĪ (D. 1144;
SAMARQAND), TUḤFAT AL-FUQAHĀʾ 301–02 (Muḥammad Zakī ʿAbd al-Barr ed., 1958) (Ḥanafī:
dominant opinion is that a husband may not take more than dower, but minority opinion permits
taking more than dower, so the ruling is that if the couple agreed to more than dower, it stands); 2
MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 194–95 (Ḥanafī: it is legally permissible for husband to take more
than the dower); 10 MUWAFFAQ AL-DĪN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN AHMAD IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ (D.
1223; SYRIA), AL-MUGHNĪ 269–70 (ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Turkī & ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ
Muḥammad Ḥulw eds., 2d ed. 1992) (Ḥanbalī: it is permissible, but unfavorable, for husband to take
more than dower; notes conflicting juristic opinions); 2 MAJD AL-DĪN ABĪ AL-BARAKĀT ʿABD ALSALĀM IBN ʿABD ALLĀH IBN AL-KHIDR IBN TAYMĪYAH AL-HARRĀNĪ (d. 1254/5; SYRIA/IRAQ),
MUHARRAR FĪ AL-FIQH ʿALÁ MADHHAB AL-IMĀM AHMAD IBN HANBAL 99 (Shams al-Dīn Ibn
Mufliḥ al-Ḥanbalī al-Maqdisī et al. eds., 1999) (Ḥanbalī: a khulʿ divorce settlement may not exceed
dower); JAʿFAR IBN AL-HASAN MUHAQQIQ AL-HILLĪ (D. 1277; IRAQ), MUKHTASAR AL-NĀFIʿ FĪ
FIQH AL-IMĀMĪYAH 227–28 (Imāmī Shīʿī: discussing debate about fidya) (1967). The majority Shāfiʿī
opinion permits a husband to take more than the dower as part of the khulʿ divorce settlement,
whereas the minority Shāfiʿī opinion disapproves of this practice. 16 AL-NAWAWĪ et al., supra note
123, at 8–9 (Shāfiʿī: discussing divorce settlement amounts); MUHAMMAD IBN MAKKĪ SHAHĪD ALAWWAL (D. 1384; SYRIA), AL-LUMʿAH AL-DIMASHQĪYAH FĪ FIQH AL-IMĀMĪYAH 199–200
(Muḥammad Taqī Murwārīd & ʿAlī Aṣghar Murwārīd eds., 1990) (Imāmī Shīʿī: a husband may take
more than the dower in khulʿ, but he may not take more than dower in mubāraʾah).
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to debate the classification of wife-initiated divorce as revocable or irrevocable
(roughly equivalent to breach and rescission of the marriage contract).132 To
summarize, Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs, later Shāfiʿ īs, minority Ḥanbalīs, and a majority of
late antique jurists viewed khulʿ as equivalent to divorce; but earlier Shāfiʿ īs, a
majority of Ḥanbalīs, and a minority of late antique jurists considered khulʿ to be
recission ( faskh).133 While there is no indication that jurists prohibited any of the
divorce types previously practiced,134 the distinctions between earlier and later
legal texts imply that a woman’s access to divorce became limited to particular
circumstances.135 In theory, women still had the legal right to divorce their
husbands by paying a divorce settlement.136 Yet, juristic restrictions (as outlined in

132. Zamakhsharī explains that khulʿ is a divorce (ṭalāq) for Ḥanafīs, whereas it is dissolution
( faskh) for Shāfiʿīs. The difference is that Ḥanafīs permit reconciliation between the spouses under
the original contract, whereas Shāfiʿīs do not. MAHMŪD IBN ʿUMAR ZAMAKHSHARĪ (D. 1144;
KHWĀRAZM), RUʾŪS AL-MASĀʾIL (AL-MASĀʾIL AL-KHILĀFĪYAH BAYNA AL-HANAFĪYAH WA-ALSHĀFIʿĪYAH) 404–06 (ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad ed., 1987); see also 2 SAMARQANDĪ, supra note 131,
at 299 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable divorce); 3 MAHMŪD IBN AHMAD MARGHĪNĀNĪ (D. 1219/20;
FARGHĀNA), AL-MUHĪT AL-BURHĀNĪ FĪ AL-FIQH AL-NUʿMĀNĪ 501 (Aḥmad ʿIzzū ʿInāyah ed., 2003)
(Ḥanafī: khulʿ is irrevocable divorce); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 274–75
(Ḥanbalī: cites conflicting reports among jurists about khulʿ as divorce or recission); 2 IBN TAYMĪYAH
AL-HARRĀNĪ, supra note 131, at 98 (Ḥanbalī: khulʿ is an irrevocable divorce); AHMAD IBN ʿABD ALHALĪM IBN TAYMĪYAH (D. 1328; SYRIA), MAJMŪʿ MIN AL-FATĀWÁ AL-KUBRÁ LIL-IMAM IBN
TAYMĪYAH § 32, at 289 (Saʿīd Muḥammad al-Laḥḥām ed., 1993) (Ḥanbalī: cited conflicting reports
among jurists about khulʿ as divorce or recission); MUHAQQIQ AL-HILLĪ, supra note 131, at 227
(Imāmī Shīʿī: summarizing debate on legal status of khulʿ); 3 ʿUTHMĀN IBN ʿALĪ AL-ZAYLAʿĪ ALHANAFĪ (D. 1342/3) ET AL., TABYĪN AL-HAQĀʾIQ; SHARH KANZ AL-DAQĀʾIQ 182 (Aḥmad ʿAzzū
ʿInāyah ed., 2000) (Ḥanafī: khulʿ is an irrevocable divorce).
133. MUSTAFA DHAHABĪ, AL-KHULʿ WA-AHKĀMUHU FĪ AL-SHARĪʿAH AL-ISLĀMĪYAH 60
(2000).
134. For instance, husbands continued to give wives the option of divorce with receipt of the
full divorce settlement, as evidenced in medieval juristic texts. 2 SAMARQANDĪ, supra note 131, at
279–88 (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option); BURHĀN AL-DĪN AL-FARGHĀNĪ AL-MARGHĪNĀNĪ (D.
1197; FARGHĀNA), AL-HIDĀYAH: THE GUIDANCE. 593–605 (Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans.,
2006) (Ḥanafī: giving wife divorce option); 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 83–84 (Shāfiʿī: husband
gives a wife the option to divorce and receive full dower); 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at
88–93 (Shāfiʿī: a husband offers a wife a divorce option). Jurists distinguish between “takhyīr (granting
a choice) and tamlīk (granting possession of the right).” 2 IBN RUSHD, supra note 130, at 84
(summarizing the juristic debates on these divorce types); see also 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH
(1664–1672) 387–409 (Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī 1980) (n.d.) (Ḥanafī: men giving women a
divorce option without losing dower).
135. Abuse and repulsiveness continued to be cited as grounds for a woman to pursue a khulʿ
divorce. For example, a Shāfiʿī text cites the main ḥadīth (as precedent) about a woman who pursued
a khulʿ divorce because her husband was abusive, but jurists cautioned against allowing khulʿ when a
husband is intentionally abusive in order to avoid paying the divorce settlement. 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET
AL., supra note 123, at 3–6 (Shāfiʿī: physical abuse as provoking wife-initiated divorce); 2 NŪR AL-DĪN
ʿALĪ IBN ABĪ BAKR HAYTHAMĪ (D. 1405), GHĀYAT AL-MAQSŪD FĪ ZAWĀʾID AL-MUSNAD 267–68
(Khalāf Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Samīʿ ed., 2001) (Shāfiʿī: implying that Ḥabībah pursued khulʿ because her
husband was repulsive).
136. Ibn Rushd notes that “there is no dispute that a woman possessing discretion (a rashīda)
has a right to transact redemption herself[.]” 2 IBN RUSHD, supra note 130, at 82; see also 10 IBN
QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 267 (Ḥanbalī: wife has the right to “ransom” divorce); 16
AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 2 (Shāfiʿī: “[I]f a woman loathes her husband . . . she may
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jurisprudential texts) seem to have limited this right to cases where a wife could
establish grounds for divorce or to situations where the husband concedes to the
divorce settlement.137 Notably, juristic discussions of wife-initiated divorce often
occur adjacent to or in conjunction with the topic of recalcitrance.138 Still,
medieval and early modern court records establish that women continued to
acquire divorces by forfeiting part or all of their dowers.139 Indeed, it is possible
that wife-initiated (khulʿ ) divorces superseded judicial grants of divorce in which
women were given full dowers.
What this condensed chronology of Muslim women’s access to divorce
suggests is that jurists gradually interfered with a wife’s ability to divorce her
husband. Notably, husbands gained the option of divorcing and paying less than
the standard divorce settlement in a variety of situations.
IV. DISENCHANTING THE ORTHODOX NARRATIVES140
Thus far, I have presented two distinct chronologies—one Judaic and the
other Islamic—in which I outlined historical changes in how jurists of each
community conceptualized a woman’s right to divorce. In both of these
chronologies, jurists interpreted the legal opinions and practices of their
predecessors within a juristic construction of historical “truth” that informs legal
orthodoxy. The historical evidence presented in these two chronologies contrasts
remove him by [paying] compensation . . . .”). But numerous legal texts apply the term khulʿ to a
husband divorcing his wife and not paying the full divorce settlement. See, e.g., 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note
113, at 490–91 (Shāfiʿī). Most legal texts recognize that either spouse may divorce the other through
khulʿ. 16 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 37 (Shāfiʿī: either spouse initiates khulʿ); 1 FATĀWÁ
AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note 134, at 488 (Ḥanafī: khulʿ in the masculine verbal form).
There is some inconsistency between the practice being identified as a woman’s option, but specified
as necessitating a husband’s verbalization of the divorce.
137. Ibn Rushd explains “the majority held that [redemption divorce] is permitted with the
mutual consent of the parties, unless consent to pay him is obtained by fear of injury to her.” 2 IBN
RUSHD, supra note 130, at 81; see also 2 MARGHĪNĀNĪ, supra note 122, at 194 (Ḥanafī: implying that
khulʿ necessitates mutual consent); 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note 134, at 488
(Ḥanafī: implying through dual verbal form that khulʿ is mutual agreement between spouses). Jurists
acknowledge that either spouse may initiate khulʿ, but do not account for how to deal with a
husband’s refusal. AHMAD IBN LUʾLUʾ IBN AL-NAQĪB (D. 1368; EGYPT), ʿUMDAT AL-SĀLIK WAʿUDDAT AL-NĀSIK 336 (Ṣāliḥ Muʾadhdhin et al. eds., 1979) (Shāfiʿī: khulʿ is permissible when one or
both spouses want to end the marriage).
138. 2 IBN TAYMĪYAH AL-HARRĀNĪ, supra note 131, at 95, 97 (Ḥanbalī: section on
recalcitrance immediately precedes section on khul ʿ); 3 AL-ZAYLAʿĪ AL-HANAFĪ ET AL., supra note
132, at 185 (Ḥanafī: Prophetic precedent concerning Ḥabibah’s khulʿ divorce is explicitly interpreted
as an example of a woman’s recalcitrance); 1 FATĀWÁ AL-ʿĀLAMGĪRĪYAH (1664–1672), supra note
134, at 488 (Ḥanafī: associating khulʿ with nushūz of either spouse). Contemporary Egyptian Islamistfeminist ʿAblah Kaḥlāwī begins her monograph on khulʿ with a discussion of recalcitrance (nushūz ),
but argues that recalcitrance is not a condition for khulʿ divorces. KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 64.
139. See Ronald C. Jennings, Divorce in the Ottoman Sharia Court of Cyprus, 1580–1640, 78
STUDIA ISLAMICA 155 (1993) (discussing instances of khulʿ divorces in Ottoman Cyprus).
140. A version of this section was presented as part of a panel I organized on “Comparative
Contextualizations of Jewish Legal History” at the Association for Jewish Studies annual conference
in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 20, 2011).
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with the “orthodox” stories—the reductive narratives that are constructed and
repeated by historical actors and contemporary scholars. The orthodox Islamic
legal story elides distinctions between the legal practices of the late antique and
medieval periods, creating a seamless narrative of women being able to negotiate a
divorce only by forfeiting their dowers—or more. On its own, the Islamic
chronology detailed above implies that medieval Muslim jurists construed a
Prophetic precedent about wife-initiated divorce as requiring a husband’s consent
or necessitating a husband’s fault; consequently, they elaborated a variety of
restrictions on wife-initiated divorce.
The orthodox Jewish legal story narrates legal changes to legitimate
normative practice. In what is described as the Rabbinic period (70–620 CE),
women did not have a no-fault divorce option because they could initiate a
divorce only if they could prove just cause. In the Geonic period (620–1050 CE),
the rabbis felt “pressured” by the influence of Islamic courts to change existing
practices by facilitating a no-fault divorce option for women. In the era of the
Rishonim (1050–1400 CE), the rabbis corrected the “deviant” Geonic practice and
returned Jewish law to its “original” foundations by prohibiting women from nofault divorce.
The orthodox Islamic narrative obscures that the specific procedural
requirement of obtaining a husband’s acquiescence to the wife’s divorce initiation
likely emerged in the medieval period. The orthodox Jewish narrative obscures
that the Geonic practice of coercing a husband to divorce a “recalcitrant” wife was
normative for centuries until its gradual undermining in the late medieval period.
When these two orthodox stories and the two chronologies enumerated above are
all juxtaposed, a pattern begins to emerge.
I want to problematize a specific point of intersection between these two
narratives: the orthodox Jewish narrative characterizes the Geonic enactment
(taqqanah) as an innovation (i.e., lacking talmudic precedent) caused by Islamic
“influence” and many scholars accept this perspective.141 The question I want to
explore is why this Geonic decree has been interpreted—both by some Rishonim
and by some contemporary scholars—as having deviated from Talmudic
practice.142 This Geonic decree’s classification is the site of a contest for legal
141. See supra text accompanying note 56. But see 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN
PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 298 (arguing that wife-initiated divorce was a pre-Islamic Jewish
custom); see also Westreich, supra note 51, at 16 (“Demanding a divorce . . . did not have to be based
on any condition, but was based rather on the law of moredet itself. Accordingly, the reason why the
amoraim do not discuss the right to demand divorce is that it was already known and accepted, rather
than this being the ‘point of the innovation’ of the condition.”).
142. My claim is that the characterization of the Geonic decree as deviating from the Talmud
or as exceeding the limits of Geonic authority is implicitly based on an evaluation of the Geonic
context. In other words, those Rishonim who rejected the Geonic ordinance as an innovation did so
because they believed it was “caused” by Islamic influence. Westreich, supra note 3, at 217 (describing
the opinion of Rishonim: “Halakhic sources explicitly indicate that the aim of this ruling was to
prevent malicious manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced Jewish men to grant a divorce
demanded by women claiming ‘repulsion.’”).
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authority, and I will provide historical and critical evidence to offer an alternative
understanding of this Jewish law in its presumed “Islamic” context.
A late medieval rabbinic consensus gradually developed in the West that
viewed the Geonic decree as an “innovation” caused by the “influence” of Gentile
courts. Contemporary scholars who presume that the Gentile courts were Islamic
characterize the Geonic decree as being caused by Islamic pressure—of some
kind.143 But these two characterizations of “innovation” and “influence” must be
reevaluated because they obscure a complicated historical struggle for legal
authority. Discrediting the Geonic legal practice of facilitating a recalcitrant wife’s
divorce claim may be a manifestation of Western rabbinic authority overpowering
Eastern rabbinic authority.144
The implications of the two characterizations that I will challenge are
manifest in a specific example. There is suggestive evidence of Jewish women
divorcing their husbands prior to the Islamic period and the interpretation of that
evidence is driven by interpretations of the Geonic decree. In other words, those
who view the decree as an extension of a continuous practice (i.e., the Talmud
sanctions the practice of coercing husbands to divorce a wife) thus recognize that
Jewish wives had a long-standing ability to initiate unilateral divorce.145 In
contrast, those who view the decree as a legal “innovation” based on “foreign
influence” thereby negate the possibility that Jewish wives could initiate divorce
outside the judicially recognized justifications.146 Therefore, the historical and
contemporary interpretation of this decree has significant stakes for Jewish legal
practice and the conventional narratives should be scrutinized.

143. Contemporary scholars perpetuate these assumptions about “innovation” and
“influence.” For instance, like other contemporary scholars, Brody characterizes the Geonic decree as
“dictated by profound changes in the circumstances affecting Jewish life in the Muslim world, and
more particularly in Babylonia, which necessitated a departure from Talmudic law.” BRODY, supra note
49, at 62 (emphasis added).
144. Libson suggests that “[r]ejections of geonic rulings are more common among Ashkenazi
scholars, who allowed themselves more latitude in legal decisions than the Sephardim.” Gideon
Libson, Halakhah and Law in the Period of the Geonim, in AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND
SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW 197, 241 (N. S. Hecht et al. eds., 1996).
145. See supra text accompanying note 21. Jewish wives appear to have been able to initiate
divorce in Babylonia (possibly prior to the Geonic decree) and in Palestine (based on a practice of
including a stipulation in the marriage contract). Elimelech Westreich notes that “between the
Talmudic period and the time close to the Shulḥan Arukh, Jewish law had sustained a divorce regime
enabling the woman to coerce her husband to grant a divorce without submitting a defined ground.”
Westreich, supra note 3, at 207.
146. See supra text accompanying note 20 (providing various works on conflicting scholarly
debate surrounding the evidence for Jewish women divorcing their spouses in antiquity and late
antiquity); see also LIBSON, supra note 50, at 158.
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A. Reevaluating Causal Influence
At the time of the Geonic decree (mid-seventh century),147 a minority of the
population was Muslim and Islamic courts were not adjudicating outside the
garrison towns established during the Arab/Muslim conquests.148 That a minority
Muslim presence could have such significant effect on Jewish legal practice as to
provoke the enactment within decades of the beginning of Iraq’s conquest is
improbable. In other words, the orthodox narrative’s claim that the Geonim
“deviated” from Talmudic practice in order to defend against the threat of Muslim
“influence”—coercive or otherwise—is based on inaccurate historical evidence.149
The majority population at this time was actually Christian or Zoroastrian; among
Eastern Christians and Zoroastrians, women returning their dowers in order to
effect a divorce is a historically-verified practice.150 Since local communities
operated courts, the Gentile courts that provoked the Geonic decree may not have
been Islamic even after the Muslim conquests.151 Indeed, wife-initiated divorce
may not have been the dominant Islamic legal practice, since it was the subject of
intense juristic debate among Muslims and possibly only one of many legal
positions.152 Moreover, it is particularly improbable that any potential Islamic legal
147. Libson dates the decree to 650 or 651 CE and while it may be possible to date it to a
slightly later period, these historical observations hold true. LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111.
148. Hallaq explains that Islamic law was only applied in the garrison towns and parts of the
Arabian peninsula for the first several decades after the Prophet’s death. WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE
ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF ISLAMIC LAW 54–55 (2005). Morony observes that Islamic law was
not applied to Jews and he suggests that rabbinic authority increased as a result of the noninvolvement of Muslims in their internal legal affairs. MICHAEL G. MORONY, IRAQ AFTER THE
MUSLIM CONQUEST 320, 518 (1984). In contrast, Libson rejects that the decree’s proximity in time to
the Arab/Muslim conquests weakens the assumption of influence. Libson, supra note 144, at 238. But
Libson does not provide historical evidence about the administration of Islamic courts in the midseventh century to substantiate his influence claim.
149. Indeed, common interpretations of the Geonic decree suggest prejudicial and
anachronistic assumptions. For example, a contemporary scholar argues that the Geonic decree does
not represent absorption of legal concepts of one culture into another culture, but rather a defensive
act of a minority culture against the destructive influence of the surrounding majority culture.
Yehudah Zvi Stampfer, Islamic Influence in the Divorce Laws of Rav Samuel Ben Hofni Gaon and the Rambam,
in ʿALE ʿASOR: DIVRE HA-VEʿIDAH HA-ʿASIRIT SHEL HA-HEVRAH LE-HEKER HA-TARBUT HAʿARVIT-HA-YEHUDIT SHEL YEME-HA-BENAYIM 312 (Soc’y for Judaeo-Arabic Studies et al. eds.,
2008). This is based on an inaccurate understanding of history: the majority of the population in Iraq
(or the Near East more generally) was Christian and did not become Muslim until several centuries
later.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 185, 187, 190. Of course, it is not the only practice,
since “from the reign of Constantine [306–337 CE] onwards, the legislation on divorce was sometimes
tightened, sometimes relaxed. For a long time, the laws remained much more liberal in the eastern
empire than in the west.” ANTTI ARJAVA, WOMEN AND LAW IN LATE ANTIQUITY 258 (1996).
151. See supra text accompanying note 148.
152. By way of example, Muslim jurists debated the necessity of having a legal justification or
court involvement for khulʿ. Two late antique Muslim jurists—al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (d. 728 CE) and Ibn
Sīrīn (d. 729 CE)—had an exceptional opinion that khulʿ is only permissible with judicial oversight.
KAHLĀWĪ, supra note 104, at 69; 6 SARAKHSĪ, supra note 119, at 173 (Ḥanafī: court involvement not
necessary for khulʿ); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 268–69 (Ḥanbalī: conflicting
reports about the necessity of court involvement in khul ʿ); see also DHAHABĪ, supra note 133, at 51–59.
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“influence” was coercive. The orthodox Jewish narrative inaccurately assumes the
existence of Islamic influence that is actually negated by historical evidence.
More probable than the existence or prevalence of Islamic courts is the
possibility that Jewish women simply knew that non-Jewish women who
demanded divorces did not have to wait one year, in addition to having relatively
more expansive inheritance and property rights. Threatened by the possibility of
Jewish women converting (to any religion), Geonic rabbis likely reduced the
waiting period; this practical modification can be interpreted as reacting to an
internal social demand—not necessarily “influence.” In legal terminology, we can
identify this kind of legal change as “social welfare” or “public interest” and it is
endemic to all legal systems. Moreover, forum shopping of legal consumers
shaped legal changes. While Jewish women in the Near East and North Africa
were able to acquire divorces in rabbinic courts under a recalcitrant wife claim
throughout the medieval period,153 they apparently still frequented state (i.e.,
Islamic) courts.154 Even in places where rabbinic courts facilitated wife-initiated
divorce, Jewish women availed themselves of state (i.e., Islamic) courts because
the Geonic enactment did not prevent Jewish women from accessing other legal
options.155 To appreciate the dynamics of legal pluralism, we need to recognize
such complexities as venue shopping and socio-economic barriers to legal
consumerism.
Gil noted that “there was still no clear-cut Muslim law with regard to divorce.” MOSHE GIL, A
HISTORY OF PALESTINE, 634–1099, at 164 (Ethel Broido trans., 1992).; see also Libson, supra note 144,
at 238 (acknowledging the possibility of Islamic legal diversity, but discounting it).
153. Westreich notes that at the end of the fourteenth century, there were “Jewish
communities living in a distinctively Moslem [sic] environment where the rebellious wife suit was
accepted without question.” Westreich, supra note 3, at 216. This was likely practiced in different
ways. Goitein suggests, based on surviving documentary evidence, that women often initiated
divorces; Genizah evidence indicates that some powerful women were able to pressure their exhusbands to give them considerable divorce settlements that appear to have been larger than their
dowers. 3 GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 266.
154. Goitein mentions a Jewish woman who divorced her husband in an Islamic court. 3
GOITEIN, supra note 18, at 265. On Jews frequenting Islamic courts for divorce, see URIEL I.
SIMONSOHN, A COMMON JUSTICE: THE LEGAL ALLEGIANCES OF CHRISTIANS AND JEWS UNDER
EARLY ISLAM 178–80 (2011); see also ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ, THE JEWS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
IN THE LATE FIFTEENTH AND THE SIXTEENTH CENTURIES: ADMINISTRATIVE, ECONOMIC,
LEGAL, AND SOCIAL RELATIONS AS REFLECTED IN THE RESPONSA 67 (1984) (“[S]ixteenth century
matrimonial cases were frequently referred to Muslim law courts.”). Pertaining to the early modern
period, Al-Qattan notes:
The frequency and ease with which Jewish and Christian men and women went to the
Muslim court in connection with marriage and divorce suggests, on the one hand, that
such recourse was neither unusual nor fraught with communally burdensome
consequences. It also illustrates the ways in which Christian and Jewish women availed
themselves of the wife-instigated kinds of divorce not available to them according to the
rules of their respective faiths.
Najwa Al-Qattan, Dhimmis in the Muslim Court: Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination, 31 INT’L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 429, 435 (1999).
155. It may, however, be the case that (rabbinic) Jewish women continued to seek judicial
divorce decrees from state (i.e., Islamic) courts in situations where a Jewish husband refused to deliver
a divorce decree.
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In addition, the “influence” theory does not sufficiently explain how the
Geonic enactment “protected” the Jewish community from two realities: the
availability of state (such as Islamic courts) that facilitated a Jewish wife’s divorce
and the possibility of conversion.156 The orthodox narrative claims that Jewish
women who had to wait twelve months for a divorce fell into indecency (i.e., illicit
affairs) or apostatized (presumably becoming Muslim).157 Ostensibly, the Geonim
dispensed with the long waiting period in order to hasten a Jewish woman’s
divorce and prevent her apostasy for the purpose of divorcing her Jewish
husband.158 Yet a Jewish woman who became Muslim would not necessarily have
been automatically divorced because this Islamic doctrine was not clearly
established in the mid-seventh century.159
How might the Geonic rabbis have compelled a husband to deliver a divorce
156. LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111.
157. An anonymous thirteenth century text identifies both moral indecency and apostasy as
causal factors motivating the Geonic decree. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 52–53.
158. By the early medieval era, the consensus of Muslim jurists was that a married woman
who became Muslim would be divorced unless her husband also converted within her divorce waiting
period. 5 MUHAMMAD IBN IDRĪS AL-SHĀFIʿĪ (D. 820; ARABIA/EGYPT), MAWSŪʿAT AL-IMĀM ALSHĀFIʿĪ AL-KITĀB AL-UMM: KITĀB AL-NIKĀH 149 (Aḥmad Badr al-Dīn Ḥassūn ed., 1996) (Shāfiʿī: if
a woman becomes Muslim and her husband does not convert within the waiting period, they are
divorced); 2 SAHNŪN ET AL., supra note 114, at 216 (Mālikī: a woman’s conversion to Islam
constitutes divorce unless husband converts within waiting period); 2 TIRMIDHĪ, supra note 109, at
405 (reporting that a husband of the Prophet’s daughter became Muslim within her waiting period
and that this is the opinion of Mālik ibn Anas, al-Awzāʿī, al-Shāf iʿī, Aḥmad, and Isḥāq); IBN ABĪ
ZAYD AL-QAYRAWĀNĪ, supra note 119, at 196 (Mālikī: a non-Muslim woman who becomes Muslim is
divorced from her non-Muslim husband unless he converts); 7 IBN HAZM, AL-MUHALLĀ, supra note
125, at 364 (Ẓāhirī: a woman who becomes Muslim while married to a non-Muslim is divorced
immediately); 2 AL-SHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 456 (Shāfiʿī: a woman who becomes Muslim is
divorced after the waiting period unless her husband also converts); 10 IBN QUDĀMAH AL-MAQDĪSĪ,
supra note 131, at 8–10 (Ḥanbalī: a woman who becomes Muslim is divorced after the waiting period
unless her husband also converts); 15 AL-NAWAWĪ ET AL., supra note 123, at 451–59 (Shāfiʿī: a
woman’s conversion to Islam is divorce).
159. It is unclear if the seventh-century Muslim community viewed the conversion of a wife
as automatically resulting in a divorce. The main precedential authority for this doctrinal rule is that
the Prophet’s daughter (Zaynab) became Muslim prior to her husband (Abī al-ʿĀṣī) and the latter was
not forced to convert, although he did so eventually. There are other reports from the Prophetic era
about non-Muslim husbands being given time (one month to several months) to convert after their
wives became Muslim. Many sources suggest that a non-Muslim woman who became Muslim had the
option of divorce or staying with her non-Muslim husband. 7 AL-SANʿĀNĪ, supra note 88, at 173–75
(reporting conflicting narratives about the effects of conversion on marriage between Muslim woman
and non-Muslim man); 4 IBN ABĪ SHAYBAH, supra note 89, at 109–10 (reporting conflicting opinions
about a woman who converts, either she is divorced or she can choose to stay with her non-Muslim
husband). Medieval jurists seem to have understood the Prophetic practice of giving husbands an
opportunity to convert as corresponding to the divorce waiting period. See, e.g., 2 SAHNŪN ET AL.,
supra note 114, at 211–15 (Mālikī). But there are reports that the length of time between Zaynab’s
conversion and her husband’s conversion was significantly longer than the divorce waiting period of a
few months. 2 TIRMIDHĪ, supra note 109, at 405 (citing six years between the conversion of the
Prophet’s daughter and her husband). Similarly, Ibn ʿAbbās reports that the Prophet’s daughter
became Muslim eight years prior to her husband and jurists offered various “rationalizations” for why
this length of time either did not constitute a precedent or was inaccurate. 10 IBN QUDĀMAH ALMAQDĪSĪ, supra note 131, at 10–11 (Ḥanbalī).

50

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:19

decree instantaneously when husbands very often delayed the process? If the
Geonic practice removed the twelve-month waiting period and then relied on
coercing the husband to grant a wife a divorce, the “threat” of conversion to
Islam remained. That is, a Jewish woman might simply become Muslim and
demand a judicial divorce decree from an Islamic court, rather than wait for her
husband to deliver her divorce decree under coercion. It is no coincidence then
that the Qaraites—in the eleventh century or earlier—accepted judicial divorce
decrees and that Maimonides denounced the practice as heretical.160 Notably, the
specific wording of several Geonic texts implies that courts granted or gave Jewish
women divorces, without explicitly delineating that the courts coerced husbands
to deliver divorce decrees.161 While we cannot make conclusions based on this
precise terminology, it is likely that judicial divorce decrees became a site of Jewish
orthodox contestation in the medieval period. It was not only Muslim “influence”
that concerned the rabbis, but also the sectarian influence of Qaraites. Western
rabbinic jurists may have marked the boundaries of rabbinic orthodoxy against
Qaraite “heresy” through this particular legal issue. The extent to which
generalizations may be made from this case study to broader processes of
sectarian resistance and regional competition in the shaping of rabbinic Jewish
orthodoxy is a matter for further research.
B. Giving Voice to the Geonim
Most Geonim did not view their practice of facilitating wife-initiated divorce
as divergent from Talmudic traditions.162 The Geonic enactment included two
components: (a) the removal of the twelve-month waiting period (stipulated in the
Babylonian Talmud) for the recalcitrant wife and (b) coercion of the husband to
160.
Au XIe siècle, probablement sous influence musulmane, la loi caraïte évolue vers le
renforcement des droits de la femme. Dorénavant, le divorce peut être effectué à la
demande de la femme par le tribunal, si le mari refuse de rédiger la lettre de divorce. Cette
possibilité de divorce par decision juridique constitue une difference important par rapport
au droit rabbanite. Par consequent, un divorce caraïte obtenu de telle façon ne pouvait être
valable selon la loi rabbanite. Cependant, il semble que le divorce par decision juridique
avait un caractère exceptionnel et que la façon la plus répandue de divorcer nécessitait
toujours la redaction d’une letter par le mari. En effet, la Geniza du Caire ne nous fournit
que des exemples de ce dernier type de documents.
Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, La Lettre de Divorce Caraïte et sa Place Dans les Relations Caraïtes et Rabbanites au
Moyen Age, 155 REVUE DES ÉTUDES JUIVES 337, 342 (1996). I disagree with the author’s
characterization of this Qaraite practice as being based on Islamic “influence.” See also MAIMONIDES,
supra note 72, Hilchot Gerushin, 2:20 at 177–78. Maimonides’ critique of non-Jewish courts coercing
Jewish husbands is evidence that the practice existed, but not a negation of the possibility that nonrabbinic courts provided judicial divorce decrees.
161. By way of example, see the following responsum: “After the gemara, our rabbis decreed
that even what she holds (from him) we take from her and we give her a divorce immediately . . . .”
HARKAVY, supra note 62, § 71 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying note 52.
162. Westreich notes that “according to the Geonim, the source of the halakha coercing the
husband to grant a divorce to his rebellious wife is the Talmud itself. Several geonic writings indeed
state so specifically.” Westreich, supra note 3, at 209; see also 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE IN
PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 324.
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grant a recalcitrant wife a divorce.163 The Geonim perceived the first component
as new, but not the second.164 Yet, later rabbinic authorities interpreted both
components of the decree as “innovative,” despite the Geonic perspective that
they had preserved rabbinic Jewish tradition.165 The orthodox narrative thereby
marks as heretical the prolonged practice of Geonic communities who facilitated
wife-initiated divorce.166
The characterization of the Geonic decree as an “innovation” is motivated
by the causal presumption of “influence.” It is commonly assumed that the
availability of divorce for women in contemporaneous Islamic courts led Geonic
rabbis to modify divorce practices.167 However, Geonic texts do not explicitly
identify Islamic courts as being a causal influence on the decree. For example,
Naṭrōnāī ben Hilāī (or Natronai Gaon, d. ninth century, Iraq) explained the
rationale for the decree as so “that Jewish women should not stray towards
lewdness and indecency.”168 Some Geonic sources do not mention a reason for
the enactment.169 Of course, these Geonim may have been influenced by Islamic
legal practices and simply did not admit it. But in analyzing this historical event,
we should focus on the consistency and plausibility of historical interpretations. In
light of the aforementioned historical evidence, early Geonim did not cite Islamic
“influence” for the decree because no such “influence” existed in their time.
In contrast, Sherira ben Ḥanina (Sherira Gaon, d. 1006 CE, Iraq), writing in
the late tenth century, identified the decree as being an attempt to prevent Jewish
women from asking Gentile courts to coerce their husbands because only a Jewish

163. A third aspect concerns the dower payment since Geonim made it collectable on
movable property. Libson, supra note 144, at 237. I suspect that it may be possible to add a fourth
aspect: the possibility that rabbinic courts granted Jewish women divorces without requiring a formal
deliverance of the divorce decree from the husband. But this possibility necessitates more research
than the scope of this Article allows.
164. Since the Geonim identified the Talmud as the source for (b), only (a) was perceived by
them as innovative. Libson explains, “Rav Sherira holds—and this seems to be the view of all the
Geonim—that the compulsory nature of the divorce had already been laid down in the Talmud, the
only new element in the taḳḳanah being the stipulation that divorce be granted forthwith, without
delay.” Id.; see also Westreich, supra note 3, at 209.
165. This is reflected in much of the scholarly literature. By way of example, Libson notes that
“since the talmudic text itself could not be easily interpreted and the details of the taḳḳanah itself were
not known, the interpretation became a matter of controversy among the Geonim themselves. It is
therefore difficult to determine the taḳḳanah’s precise degree of deviation from talmudic law proper.”
Libson, supra note 144, at 236 (emphasis added).
166. By way of example, Genizah evidence indicates that in Palestinian marriage contracts of
the tenth and eleventh centuries, “Either party was empowered, thereby, to demand a divorce for
purely subjective reasons and was not compelled to prove cause.” 1 FRIEDMAN, JEWISH MARRIAGE
IN PALESTINE, supra note 22, at 330.
167. “There is no doubt that the redress open to women in the Shariʿa courts spurred the
geonim to provide similar redress in Jewish law.” LIBSON, supra note 50, at 111; see also Westreich,
supra note 3, at 217–18.
168. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 51.
169. Halakhot Gedolot does not explain the enactment’s rationale. Id. at 48–49.
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court can legitimately coerce a Jewish husband to divorce his wife.170 In Sherira
Gaon’s lifetime, Islamic courts were prevalent and, when petitioned by Jewish
wives, they probably coerced Jewish husbands to deliver divorce decrees—or
possibly granted divorce decrees to Jewish wives. Sherira Gaon may have
anachronistically interpreted the reasons for the seventh-century Geonic decree
based on his own reality; that is, since Sherira was surrounded by Islamic courts,
he may have simply assumed that his Geonic predecessors were likewise
“competing” with Muslim jurists for Jewish litigants. Notably, Sherira Gaon is the
only known Geonic figure to attribute the influence of Gentile courts to the
Geonic decree.171
C. Which Context?
What is problematic about “influence” as a characterization for a particular
historical event? “Influence” is very often code for “infiltration” or “impurity.”
The orthodox understanding of the Geonic decree focuses on the causal factors
(rather than context) that led to its enactment and presents the decree’s gradual
overturning as if it occurred in the absence of causal factors (or a context). The
orthodox Jewish narrative validates a specific bias that can be identified in terms
of time (medieval era) and space (the West): it was Western Rishonim who
characterized the Geonic decree as unorthodox.172 What is notable about the
orthodox narrative is that Western Christian “influences” are unacknowledged or
minimized, while Islamic “influences” are vilified—and both legal systems are
drastically oversimplified.173 Moreover, the distinctions within Christian teachings
on divorce may reflect discrete regional practices.174
While it is not surprising that Western Rishonim did not describe their

170. Id. at 58–59; see also 2 ELON, supra note 56, at 659–60.
171. RISKIN, supra note 25, at 74 (citing Tykocinski as having made this observation).
172. See supra text accompanying note 82 (discussing “Western” Rishonim who overruled
North African practices in the late fourteenth century). This is also discernible in the writing of
Maimonides. See supra text accompanying note 72.
173. In reference to (Christian) Europe, Westreich, for example, claims that
the influence of the Gentile environment also affected the decline of the rebellious woman
ground, ultimately leading to its abolition. This influence, however, is indirect, as Jewish
society internalizes the social norms of the Gentile environment as a result of a prolonged
encounter, and projects them onto Jewish law through a complex mutual relationship
whose stages cannot be traced.
Westreich, supra note 3, at 218. Compare this to Westreich’s description of Islamic influence:
Halakhic sources explicitly indicate that the aim of this ruling was to prevent malicious
manipulations in Moslem [sic] courts that forced Jewish men to grant a divorce demanded
by women claiming ‘repulsion’ . . . . [T]he geonic ordinance clearly originated as a result of
factors that, although directly affecting Jewish circumstances, were extraneous to Halakhah.
Id. at 217–18. The historical evidence presented above establishes that no such Islamic “influence”
existed for the Geonic decree.
174. The Greek, but not the Hebrew, version of the Gospel of Matthew 5:31-32 limits a
husband’s grounds for divorcing his wife to adultery. GEORGE HOWARD, THE GOSPEL OF
MATTHEW ACCORDING TO A PRIMITIVE HEBREW TEXT 204 (1987); see also supra text accompanying
note 150.
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annulling of the Geonic decree as being the result of Western “influence,” it is
remarkable that contemporary scholars perpetuate this selective application of the
notion of “influence.” Westreich, for instance, noted that “the process of erosion
[of the recalcitrant wife divorce] moved along the lines of advance of Christian
society, which gradually conquered and dominated areas that had so far been
under Moslem [sic] influence and control, at least in Spain.”175 Westreich explicitly
observes that Rabbeinu Tam’s legal opinion against the recalcitrant wife divorce
occurred “as Christian society became monogamous and imposed Catholic laws
making divorce impossible.”176 Moreover, it is possible that Rabbeinu Tam (d.
1171) felt compelled to oppose wife-initiated divorce because his German
predecessor, Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028) had “enacted a decree which made it
impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her will.”177 Since Western
Jewish men had lost their ability to unilaterally divorce their wives, it became
necessary to limit the divorce options of Western Jewish women in similar ways.
Contemporary scholars pose a question about the “influences” that provoked the
Geonic decree, but not about the “influences” that led to the overturning of that
decree.
To be clear, I am not arguing for Western-Christian “influence” on the
Western Rishonim; to do so would replace one problematic “influence” paradigm
with another. Instead, I contend that all legal communities produce law in social
contexts; indeed, law cannot be disentangled from society. Just as the Geonim read
the Talmud through the intellectual concerns and socio-political realities of their
times, so too did the Western Rishonim. These two historical moments—the
enactment of the Geonic decree and its abolition by Western Rishonim—are both
reflective of, and mediated by, jurists enmeshed in their societies. Late medieval,
Western jurists marked a seventh-century Geonic decree as an “innovation”
caused by Gentile “influence” within a struggle for legal authority: the Geonic
decree was marked as “deviant” not because it occurred under Gentile
“influence,” but because its revocation occurred in a Western-Christian context.
Contemporary scholars delineated the “other” by placing a Jewish law in an
imagined “Islamic” context—instead of a historical one. Both some Western
Rishonim and some contemporary scholars employ a notion of “influence” that
manifests reductive causality and, thereby, is an impediment to deeper and more
complex understanding of legal change. Probing relationships and
contextualization can move us beyond simplified notions of “influence” that are
themselves legal-political strategies.
The extent to which generalizations may be made from this case to broader
processes of sectarian resistance and regional competition in the shaping of
rabbinic Jewish orthodoxy is a matter for further research.178 To understand each
175.
176.
177.
178.

Westreich, supra note 3, at 218.
Id.
RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii.
Libson observed that “[a]lthough [the recalcitrant wife decree] was recorded in geonic
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legal system’s transformations, we need to recognize the unending dialectic
between internal legal logic and changing socio-political circumstances. In the next
section, I narrate wife-initiated divorce outside the orthodox framework, with the
background of Near Eastern legal culture.
V. AN INTERWOVEN NARRATIVE OF WIFE-INITIATED DIVORCE
A. Antiquity and Late Antiquity (up to 800 CE )
While most Near Eastern legal systems in antiquity appear to have granted
men an unencumbered right to divorce,179 women were not precluded from
divorcing their husbands. Indeed, there is evidence of women initiating
divorces,180 which may have taken place by the act of the wife leaving the home.181
Common Near Eastern customs are apparent in some surviving ancient
Mesopotamian legal texts; as in the case of Jewish divorce practices in antiquity,
there is a scholarly debate on the issue of a woman’s ability to divorce in ancient
Mesopotamian law.182 The nature of the surviving historical evidence (primarily
legal texts and some court records) results in this inconsistency in the historical
interpretation surrounding women and divorce in the ancient Near East. But it
may be concluded that the ambiguous nature of the historical evidence itself
reflects a diverse legal reality in which some wives did divorce their husbands and
others did not.183 Despite a male, jurisprudential rhetoric legitimating divorce as a
codificatory works, such as Halakhot Peṣuḳot and Halakhot Gedolot, it did not win acceptance in later
rabbinic literature—a fate similar to that of many other taḳḳanot and customs from the geonic
period.” Libson, supra note 144, at 238.
179. DAVID L. LIEBER ET AL., DIVORCE 710–11 § 5 (Michael Berenbaum & Fred Skolnik
eds., 2d ed. 2007).
180. Roman provincial law recognized wife-initiated divorce and was likely practiced
throughout the Near East. GILLIAN CLARK, WOMEN IN LATE ANTIQUITY: PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN
LIFESTYLES 18 (1993). Jewish women divorced their husbands in second century Egypt and in
Palestine under Roman law. See Brewer, supra note 20, at 354. The main source for Zoroastrian law is
the Mādigān ī hazār dādistān and it is commonly dated to approximately 620 CE. MĀDIGĀN Ī HAZĀR
DĀDISTĀN [THE BOOK OF A THOUSAND JUDGEMENTS: A SASANIAN LAW-BOOK] (A.G.
Perikhanian trans., Mazda Publishers in association with Bibliotheca Persica 1997) (620 CE); DAS
SASANIDISCHE RECHTSBUCH “MATAKDAN I HAZAR DATISTAN” (T EIL II) 25–29, 97–120 (Maria
Macuch trans., 1981). This text notes, “When a woman having got divorce on the woman’s own
inclination . . . .” SOHRAB JAMSHEDJEE BULSARA, THE LAWS OF THE ANCIENT PERSIANS AS
FOUND IN THE “MÂTÎKÂN Ê HAZÂR DÂTASTÂN” OR “THE DIGEST OF A THOUSAND POINTS OF
LAW” 72 (1937).
181. By way of example, Sealey points out that marriage in ancient Greece was not public and
did not necessitate judicial involvement. R APHAEL SEALEY, THE JUSTICE OF THE GREEKS 68 n.30
(1994).
182.
RUSS VERSTEEG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 88 (2000) (“Scholars disagree as to
whether a wife had the legal capacity to divorce her husband.”); RAYMOND WESTBROOK, OLD
BABYLONIAN MARRIAGE LAW 79 (1988) (“The right of a wife to divorce her husband in OB [Old
Babylonian] law has been the subject of considerable dispute.”). .
183. Westbrook concludes that the conflicting evidence of a wife’s ability to initiate divorce is
the manifestation of “the difference between theory and practice.” WESTBROOK, supra note 182, at
85.
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male prerogative, women could and did divorce their husbands in practice. At
least in some cases, women in the ancient Near East had to seek judicial
intervention in order to divorce their husbands.184 Even this condensed “prehistory” suggests that, by the late antique period, there were diverse Near Eastern
customary practices of men divorcing women, women divorcing men, and judges
intervening to effect divorces.
Underlying these practices is a specific economic reality: men paid for both
marriages and divorces. Ancient Near Eastern legal texts consistently reference
divorce in terms of men paying divorce settlements.185 Since the default Near
Eastern norm was for husbands to pay dowers to their wives as part of the
marriage process, they maintained stronger privileges to divorce, which also
entailed payment of a divorce settlement to the wife. This is why women who
divorced their husbands paid for this prerogative in nearly all late antique Near
Eastern legal cultures—Jewish, Byzantine, and Islamic.186 Indeed, a basic
presumption in the region seems to have been that if a wife returned her entire
dower, then that act in and of itself constituted divorce.187 For example, late
antique divorce documents (written in Greek on papyrus) from Nessana indicate
that Christian women—both prior to and soon after the Arab/Islamic conquest—
relinquished their dowers in order to acquire a divorce.188 Juxtaposed with the
184. The Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750 BCE) mention that if a wife repudiates her husband,
an inquiry is made; if she is found to be not at fault, then she takes her dowry and leaves, but if she is
found to be at fault, she is thrown into the water. MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM
MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 108 (2d ed. 1997). Likewise, Johns asserts that “[i]t was far harder
for a woman to secure a divorce from her husband. She could do so, however, but only as the result
of a lawsuit. As a rule, the marriage-contracts mention death as her punishment, if she repudiates her
husband.” C. H. W. JOHNS, BABYLONIAN AND ASSYRIAN LAWS, CONTRACTS AND LETTERS 143
(1904).
185. Laws of Ur-Namma (ca. 2100 BCE) §§ 9–11 (indicating that a man pays upon divorcing
wife, based on wife’s status); ROTH, supra note 184, at 18; see also Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (ca. 1930 BCE)
§§ 28, 30 (limiting a man’s ability to divorce his first wife; indicates that men pay divorce settlement);
Id. at 31–32; Sumerian Laws Handbook of Forms (ca. 1700 BCE) iv 12–16 (requiring that a husband
pays the divorce settlement); Id. at 50; Laws of Eshnunna (ca. 1770 BCE) § 59 (punishing a husband
financially for divorcing a wife who is mother of his children); Id. at 68; Laws of Hammurabi (ca. 1750
BCE) §§ 137–41 (requiring that a husband who divorces wife with whom he has children pays her
dowry and half of his assets, and that a husband who divorces wife who is childless, pays a divorce
settlement that varies depending on the status of the wife); Id. at 107. One exception is Middle
Assyrian Laws (ca. 1076 BCE) A §§ 37–38 (allowing that a husband may divorce wife without paying
divorce settlement). Id. at 167.
186. In late antique Roman provincial (or Christian) law: “A woman who divorced without
grounds lost dowry and gifts and had to wait five years to remarry; a man who divorced without good
reason merely lost dowry and gifts.” CLARK, supra note 180, at 24; see also Judith Evans Grubbs,
“Pagan” and “Christian” Marriage: The State of the Question, 2 J. EARLY CHRISTIAN STUD. 361, 366 (1994)
(noting that after Constantine, husbands could financially benefit if divorce was the wife’s “fault”).
187. Case in point: while ketubbah actually means marriage contract, it is commonly used in
rabbinic literature to refer specifically to the dower payment. In other words, the marriage contract
and the dower are equivalent.
188. There are two relevant papyri from Nessana (in the Negev). The first (document 33),
which dates to the sixth century (pre-Islamic) is between Stephan and Sergius, father of Sarah;
Stephan retained the dowry and was given back the dower in order to divorce Sarah. 3 CASPER J.
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evidence from Jewish and Islamic sources cited above, this suggests that women in
the late antique Near East—regardless of confessional identity—relinquished
dowers in order to divorce their husbands.
These divorce-based monetary exchanges resemble the conceptually related
slavery and ransoming practices of the region. At the level of terminology, slaves
could financially redeem themselves to receive a manumission decree in a manner
that mimics a divorce decree in Jewish law.189 Similarly, the Qurʾ ānic verse that
grants women the option of initiating divorce indicates that women may “ransom”
themselves.190 There is a late antique exception that, perhaps, proves the rule:
while a wife may repudiate her husband according to the late antique Corpus Juris
Civilis (Roman legal code), the husband does not pay a dower, whereas the wife
pays a dowry in order to marry and her husband profits from it during the
marriage.191 Moreover, Near Eastern women of higher social status had relatively
more access to divorce, further indicating that financial means figured into a
woman’s ability to procure a divorce.192
Recognition of the diversity of late antique Near Eastern legal practices and
women’s agency suggests that there were a variety of legal maneuvers for women
to obtain divorces. It should be noted that judicial involvement likely varied
according to region—with some areas functioning without an official court. We
may characterize this period as being legally heterodox.

KRAEMER, EXCAVATIONS AT NESSANA: NON-LITERARY PAPYRI 104–06 (1958). The second
(document 57) dates to 689 CE (post-Islamic, under the Umayyad empire) and is an agreement
between Nonna and John (a priest) that is signed by seven witnesses. Id. at 161–67. Nonna’s
document states that she “waives all property claims, and asks for a divorce or release.” Id. at 162.
Kraemer suggests that document 57 is related to a libellus repudii—a document of repudiation that
Theodosius II (d. 450 CE) required (in Nov. Th. 12 pr. enacted in 439 CE) either spouse to send to
the other in a divorce. Kraemer further proposes that document 57 resembles other sixth century
papyri of repudiations—including one (POxy 129) sent from a father-in-law to a husband. Id.
189. MISHNAH, Gīṭṭīn 1:4 (comparing delivery of divorce and emancipation documents).
PALESTINIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 1:3 (describing that writs of divorce and writs of manumission are
treated the same). The slave’s emancipation decree is get shikhrūr ()ּגֵט ׁשִ חְ רּור, and a woman’s divorce
decree is get nashīm ()ּגֵט נָׁשִ ם. See also BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Gīṭṭīn 9a (revealing similarities between
divorce and emancipation documents); Qiddushin 16a (discussing slaves redeeming themselves by
payment).
190. Qurʾān 2:229 (explaining that a wife may “redeem” herself from a marriage).
191. DIG. 23.3.1 et seq (explaining that a woman pays dowry at marriage); DIG. 24.3.1 et seq
(elaborating various dowry-related cases and husband’s rights to dowry’s profits); DIG. 24.2.1 et seq
(providing that a wife or husband may repudiate spouse). Although redacted in the sixth century, the
Digest of Justinian contains legal traditions dating to earlier generations, including to the Roman
republican period. Beirut’s Roman law school was destroyed in an earthquake in 551 CE, and it is
unclear to what extent formal Roman law was subsequently taught or practiced in the region.
192. For instance, in the Parthian period, “In contrast to the legal limitations imposed upon
the commoners, the noblewomen could easily divorce their husbands. This class privilege, judging by
the tenacity of legal and social institutions, must have continued in Sasanian times.” Muhammad A.
Dandamayev et al., Divorce, ENCYCLOPEDIA IRANICA (Dec. 15, 1995), http://ww.iranicaonline
.org/articles/divorce. This same article notes that a woman who consents to divorce loses some of
her financial rights. Also, in Palestine, “Some rich or influential Jewish women divorced their
husbands under the Roman law.” Brewer, supra note 20, at 356.
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B. Medieval Era (800–1400 CE )
Legal systematization and professionalization transformed legal practice in
the Near East. Marriage and divorce became institutionalized in the medieval era.
By the twelfth century, divorce became a primarily court-mediated process and
some court intervention became normative for most divorce situations.193 The
professionalization and centralization of legal education resulted in the
consolidation of juristic opinions.194 Some form of legal orthodoxy is evident in
both Jewish and Islamic legal texts that present a hierarchy of divorce practices:
(1) husband divorces wife and pays full divorce settlement;
(2) court divorces husband and wife because of husband’s impotence,
defects, or unreasonable behavior; husband pays full divorce settlement;
(3) husband divorces wife or wife divorces husband; husband does not pay
divorce settlement or pays only part of the settlement because wife has
agreed to accept less or has been declared recalcitrant.
The third category is an intentional collapse of two distinct forms of divorce
that became ambiguous in the medieval period. The divorce of a recalcitrant wife
in the Jewish legal tradition and the forfeiting wife in the Islamic legal tradition are
procedurally the same: they are both situations of women acting to divorce their
husbands and losing some money in the process. Similarly, the formalist
expectation that a Jewish husband deliver a divorce decree or that a Muslim
husband consent to the wife’s divorce settlement are both legal-formalist
perspectives that gained ascendancy in the medieval periods.
It may be possible to discern similar shifts in juristic views of marriage and
divorce in how jurists adjudicated temporary marriage: widely practiced in late
antiquity, temporary marriages were gradually marked as deviant in the medieval
era by Sunnī jurists.195 One of the reasons Sunnī jurists offered as evidence of
temporary marriage’s illegitimacy is that, since the marriage automatically expired
at the end of the specified duration, it did not end with a divorce.196 Orthodox

193. That wife-initiated divorce occurred in an earlier period without court intervention is
substantiated by juristic texts. See supra text accompanying note 152.
194. The transformation of study circles or networks into academies was a regional process
evident among both Muslims and Jews. On the apprenticeship or study circle model of rabbinic legal
education prior to the Islamic period, see DAVID M. GOODBLATT, R ABBINIC INSTRUCTION IN
SASANIAN BABYLONIA (1975). For a similar narrative history of Islamic legal instruction, see
HALLAQ , supra note 148, at 57–78.
195. Both Jews and Muslims appear to have practiced temporary marriages throughout the
late antique period, but gradually marked it as heretical. The legitimacy of temporary marriages
became a sectarian issue between Sunnīs and Shīʿīs in the tenth century. I presented a paper on
temporary marriage among medieval Muslims and Jews with Zvi Septimus at the Jewish Law
Association meeting on July 31, 2012; we are preparing an article for publication that expounds on
that presentation.
196. 7 ʿALĪ IBN MUHAMMAD TABĀTABĀʾĪ (D. CA. 1816), RIYĀD AL-MASĀIʾL FĪ BAYĀN ALAHKĀM BI-AL-DALĀIʾL 25 (1992) (Imāmī Shīʿī: there is no divorce in a temporary marriage); 2 ALSHĪRĀZĪ, supra note 113, at 54 (Shāfiʿī: temporary marriages are void because divorce, inheritance, and
other characteristics of marriage are not present).
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jurists appear to have been anxious about women being able to end marriages
without going to court; they made a woman’s status the subject of institutional
oversight.
In all the divorce types enumerated above, men or women pay a divorce
settlement depending on which party was considered—by the court or customary
norms—to be the breaching party. Generally, women who initiated or demanded
divorce in the absence of judicially recognized justifications lost money in the
divorce process. Between late antiquity and the middle ages, these judicially
recognized justifications became more formalized. There is a substantive
difference in how the exchange is abstracted: whereas earlier divorce was akin to a
contract dissolution (modeled after ransoming or receiving an emancipation
decree), in this period, divorce became a contractual breach (modeled after a
market procedure or termination of a labor contract). Just as the employeremployee relationship is a legally rationalized version of the master-slave
relationship, so too is medieval divorce a judicially rationalized version of late
antique divorce in the Near East. Market dynamics and property-ownership
indisputably changed between late antiquity and the medieval era in ways that
directly influenced the daily lives of women. While there is undoubtedly a
connection between the region’s legal and economic history, these economic
changes cannot be reconstructed with the available historical sources.197 It is
possible that the changes enumerated here reflect broader shifts in the
relationships between contract and property.
Jurisprudential rhetoric about recalcitrant wives should be understood as
disguising situations of women demanding divorces and using a variety of legal
strategies to obtain a divorce. Restrictions on a wife’s ability to initiate a divorce
created a fault-system of divorce that is familiar in a variety of other contexts.198
Late medieval debates about Geonic practices were not unique, but rather reflect a
socio-legal process that is evident in both Jewish and Islamic legal texts of the
period: a wife’s ability to divorce her husband became more deeply embedded
within legal procedures that complicated an older practice of women simply
“paying” for a divorce. This process is discernible in the increasing emphasis on
identifying one of the spouses as being “at fault” with the consequence of
“paying” for the divorce.
By appreciating that the relationship between these legal systems was one of
a shared social space and historical tradition, we can begin to investigate what
parallel legal transformations can tell us about their socio-political contexts.

197. As Gordon has noted, “Because the economy is partially composed of legal relations,
legal and economic histories are not histories of distinct and interacting entities but simply different
cross-cutting slices out of the same organic tissue.” Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36
STAN. L. REV. 57, 124 (1984); see also Ron Harris, The Encounters of Economic History and Legal History, 21
LAW & HIST. REV. 297 (2003).
198. Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1497, 1498–1500 (2000).
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Muslim and Jewish jurists did not elaborate comparable legal schemata for divorce
because they were building on similar scriptural texts or legal precedents—indeed,
they were not. Nor did they “borrow” from the “influencing” legal system of the
“other.” Instead, the schemata are essentially alike because they reflect the
comparable customary practices, socio-political circumstances, and jurisprudential
logic of Near Eastern legal culture.
C. Speculating on the Interwoven Narrative
I have presented a Judaic chronology, followed by an Islamic chronology,
and then finally a Near Eastern story. I contend that the narrative of Near Eastern
legal pluralism is a more exact and coherent interpretation of the historical
evidence than the two preceding chronologies. Moreover, the interwoven
narrative is not implicated in any particular self-justificatory or orthodox belief; it
is then relatively more objective.199 The crux of the interwoven narrative is that
changes occurred between the eighth and twelfth centuries that resulted in
limitations on women’s abilities to initiate divorces.200 It should be noted that
consumers of these legal systems likely demanded more judicial intervention as a
means of clarifying domestic relationships that had significant financial
implications (inheritance, post-divorce alimony, maintenance, etc.). But without
sources that give “voice” to these consumers, it is difficult to reconstruct how,
why, or when they sought court involvement in marriage and divorce.
Consequently, these micro-histories offer limited explanations and it is necessary
to consider the macro-context of this case study on wife-initiated divorce. The
historical sources do demonstrate that whereas in late antiquity women had more
flexibility to simply divorce their husbands without state (whether Byzantine,
Sasanian, or, later, Islamic) involvement, by the medieval era divorce had become
a state-dominated procedure. I want briefly to consider what broad political and
social processes shaped this legal change.
In both legal systems, the role of jurists in declaring divorces intensified and
jurists thereby staked more control for themselves and, by extension, for
husbands.201 In late antiquity, divorce often occurred without judicial intervention:
Jewish men delivered notarized divorce decrees and Muslim men pronounced an
oral divorce statement, but neither procedure necessarily necessitated court
registration or involvement; Jewish or Muslim women simply left the homes of
199. I define objectivity in post-foundationalist terms. Bevir asserts that “[h]istorians can
justify their theories by showing them to be objective, where objectivity arises not out of a method,
nor a test against pure facts, but rather a comparison with rival theories.” MARK BEVIR, THE LOGIC
OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 104 (1999).
200. Not coincidentally, more historical evidence survives from the twelfth century than from
the eighth century. This certainly has an effect on how we perceive historical change, but the changes
enumerated here do not appear to be fabrications of the historical evidence.
201. Among Western Jews, however, there is an exception: Rabbeinu Gershom (d. 1028 CE)
in Germany “enacted a decree which made it impossible for a husband to divorce his wife against her
will.” RISKIN, supra note 25, at xii 109.
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their husbands and refused to return.202 But in the medieval era, local courts—
proliferating throughout the empire—gradually came to process most divorces.
The courts, in turn, were staffed by jurists who were being trained in religious
institutions of learning that were steadily becoming more technical and
bureaucratic. The informal legal circles and networks of the late antique period
were transformed into the grand academies of learning that dictated the form and
substance of legal education.203 The hundreds of legal schools that existed at the
beginning of Islamic history consolidated into the several that came to dominate
in the medieval era; likewise, numerous Jewish sects disappeared as rabbinic
Judaism came to ascendancy. While the diversity of academies of learning
preserved some of the region’s legal plurality, the boundaries between legal
orthodoxy and legal heresy were being defined ever more narrowly. These changes
in the transmission of knowledge and identification of religious authority were
occurring simultaneously among Muslims and Jews in the Near East.
What the interwoven narrative further indicates is that modifications in a
woman’s access to divorce is one site where we can witness Jewish and Muslim
jurists responding to regional, socio-economic and political changes. In both legal
systems, the notion that the breaching party should suffer a financial loss underlies
the medieval juristic discourse on divorce. Changes in women’s financial
autonomy likely corresponded to their ability to initiate divorce by paying out
divorce settlements. But the available historical evidence does not permit a clear
analysis of the economic changes that accompanied the legal changes described
here. As previously mentioned, the medieval processes of urbanization and
commercialization—and their effects on law—cannot be easily measured.
Likewise, it is unclear if a demographic shift in the number or age of men resulted
in increased limitations on women’s divorce options or protection of men’s status;
for instance, there may have been an interest in preventing women from divorcing
their husbands while the latter were away at war. There are many questions that
cannot be answered.
But there is a specific question for which we can articulate a relatively
substantive answer: how did the legal profession change? Broad transformations
in the state and in religious institutions had concrete consequences for the legal
profession. Recent research has revealed not only that the number of judges
increased, but also that their salaries doubled in the mid-eighth century as the
ʿ Abbāsid Empire (750–1258 CE) began a gradual process of systematizing and
centralizing its empire.204 These ʿ Abbāsid judges received higher salaries because

202. While papyri of marriage contracts survive from the late antique Islamic period, I was
unable to locate divorce documents in the Arabic Papyrology Database. This could be an accident of
historical survival, but I suspect it reflects that divorce was less institutionalized in late antiquity than
in the medieval era, from which both marriage and divorce documents survive.
203. See Salaymeh, supra note 84. See also my co-authored pieces on Islamic legal history in
IRA M. LAPIDUS, ISLAMIC SOCIETIES TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A GLOBAL HISTORY (2012).
204. See generally Wadād al-Qāḍī, The Salaries of Judges in Early Islam: The Evidence of the
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the empire was more prosperous, there was greater demand for judicial services,
and these judges had more training than their predecessors. This legal
professionalization resulted from the growing strength and diffusion of
institutions of religious learning and training, which appointed or designated
jurists for both Muslim and Jewish subjects.205 Judges transformed a late antique
practice of divorce as mediation into a medieval practice of divorce as judicial
procedure.
CONCLUSIONS
The syncretic framework presented here emphasizes understanding legal
systems as multivalent and dynamic systems embedded in and inseparable from
social contexts. Through historicization and contextualization, this mode of
inquiry contests the reification of religions that leads to false assumptions about
the religion’s “essence” or “primordial nature.” Religious communities, like all
communities, are the products of their contexts and cannot be understood as
transhistorical (or universal) categories.206
The reader may wonder how medieval legal opinions and procedures are
relevant to contemporary realities, considering the myriad socio-political and legal
changes of the early modern and modern periods. Beyond the precedential value
of these jurisprudential ideas, their canonical status keeps them germane. The
Islamic chronology of wife-initiated divorce can be concisely continued: The Iraqibased Ḥanafī school—one of the four surviving orthodox Sunnī schools of law
that became dominant during the medieval period—provided women with the
fewest divorce options;207 this school became the official legal school of the
Ottoman empire, whose family law codes are the basis of family laws in
contemporary Middle Eastern states.208 In the early modern period, Ottoman
court records attest to the common practice of women paying for divorces.209
Divorce law reforms during the twentieth century in the Middle East primarily
Documentary and Literary Sources, 68 J. NEAR EASTERN STUD. 9 (2009) (examining evidence of increases
in judicial salaries).
205. See my encyclopedia article, Salaymeh, supra note 84, and co-authored pieces in LAPIDUS,
supra note 203.
206. As Asad has noted, “[A] transhistorical definition of religion is not viable.” ASAD, supra
note 9, at 30.
207. The Ḥanafī school recognized sexual impotence as the primary grounds for a woman to
initiate divorce, but (unlike the other three orthodox schools of law) permitted women to include
marriage contract stipulations that would facilitate their divorce demands. See supra text accompanying
note 122; see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 53 (2d ed. 2001).
208. See supra text accompanying note 122; see also Leila Ahmed, Early Islam and the Position of
Women: The Problem of Interpretation, in WOMEN IN MIDDLE EASTERN HISTORY 58, 61 (Nikki R.
Keddie & Beth Baron eds., 1991).
209. “In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, hul (Arabic khulʿ), divorce, whereby a wife
materially compensates her husband in exchange for his consent to divorce, was a common practice
in the empire from Istanbul to Cairo and points in between.” Madeline C. Zilfi, Muslim Women in the
Early Modern Era, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF TURKEY: THE LATER OTTOMAN EMPIRE,
1603–1839, at 226, 247 (Suraiya N. Faroqhi ed., 2006).
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modified Ḥanafī doctrines.210 In recent years, several states have facilitated judicial
divorce decrees under the doctrine of khulʿ .211
Similarly, the Judaic chronology of wife-initiated divorce can be briefly
continued: Post-medieval rabbinic authorities viewed coercing a husband to
divorce a recalcitrant wife as an “innovation” resulting from “outside (i.e., Islamic)
influence” and therefore rejected it.212 But even in the early modern era, Jewish
women relinquished their financial rights to acquire divorces in Ottoman courts.213
Modern Jewish courts follow Western Rishonim in effectively denying wives the
ability to divorce their husbands without specific grounds.214 Contemporary laws
are based not simply on “authoritative” or “orthodox” precedents, but on
ideologically-based interpretations of legal history.215 I have attempted to
demonstrate that these gradual historical processes were contingent, not
inevitable.216 While some may choose to use historicism as a normative legal
strategy, specific doctrinal changes will likely be unsuccessful if they are not
coupled with deep understandings of legal-historical changes and the power
dynamics underlying them.
Understanding the porous frontier between Jewish and Islamic legal systems
necessitates combining thick descriptions of law with historically contextualizing
narratives.217 Late antique Jewish and Muslim jurists continued, modified, and
practiced Near Eastern legal pluralism. Conventional models of comparative legal
studies assume clear boundaries between legal systems; this assumption does not
210. J. N. D. Anderson, Modern Trends in Islam: Legal Reform and Modernisation in the Middle East,
20 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 (1971).
211. Lynn Welchman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE: First Time Family Law Codifications in Three Gulf
States, in THE INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW: 2010 EDITION 163, 169–71, (William
Atkin & Fareda Banda eds., 2010).
212. Libson, supra note 56, at 99.
213. “The vast majority of the [khulʿ] cases involved Muslims, the predominant population of
the area, although cases concerning Christians and Jews can also be found here and elsewhere.” Zilfi,
supra note 209, at 247.
214. Riskin claims:
Rabbenu Tam’s reading of the Talmudic texts, notwithstanding its universal acceptance by
successive generations of scholars and final incorporation into the codes, was indeed a
minority opinion, and that there is no reason not to restore the means—accepted by the
Geonim, and the early authorities of North Africa, Spain, and France—of enabling the
woman to free herself from an intolerable marriage; there are sufficient legal grounds to do
so, and it is up to the contemporary halakhic community to grant the woman her proper
due.
RISKIN, supra note 25, at xiii–xvi, 108; see also Westreich, supra note 3, at 207 (“The ruling now
prevalent is that a woman initiating divorce proceedings according to Jewish law is required to submit
a ground, chosen from a defined list appearing in the Talmud; barring such a ground, the husband
cannot be coerced to grant a divorce.”).
215. Avishalom Westreich’s extensive research into wife-initiated divorce “reveal[s] the
ideological nature of the controversy regarding the right to divorce.” Avishalom Westreich, The Right
to Divorce in Jewish Law: Between Politics and Ideology, 1 INT ’ L J. JURISPRUDENCE FAM. 177, 178 (2010).
216. This is the objective of genealogy. See generally Bevir, What is Geneology?, supra note 8.
217. In other words, I seek a balance between synchronic and diachronic explanations. See
BEVIR, supra note 199, at 252 (explaining that “the synchronic and diachronic forms of explanation
[are] appropriate to sincere, conscious, and rational beliefs”).
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correspond to the historical fluidity and porousness of Jewish and Islamic legal
systems. This case study on a woman’s access to divorce has demonstrated the
significance of both comparative and historical examination of doctrinal issues,
but the implications for social identity are countless.218 In both Jewish and Muslim
traditions, identity is intimately intertwined with law; consequently, challenging
hermetic presumptions of each legal system by demonstrating their integrated
histories contests essentialized identity claims. An anti-essentialist understanding
of law will facilitate exploring the dialectical interchange between these legal
systems, thereby illuminating the cultural and situational contexts in which laws
are formulated from their antecedents—customary practices.219
The evaluation of historical evidence by jurists, laypeople, and historians of
both Jewish and Islamic legal systems is deeply embedded within an inherited
tradition of unchallenged presumptions. In presenting this historical evidence, I
have attempted to illustrate how contemporary understandings of law are
entangled within orthodox narrative assumptions. In so doing, I have chosen to
elucidate aspects of Jewish and Islamic legal historiography silenced by orthodoxy.
There are more stories of Jewish and Islamic laws that remain untold.

218. Glenn observes: “Recognition and acceptance of the diverse legal traditions of the world
has implications for the identities which people in the world give themselves. Recognition of other
traditions as partially your own means adhering, however partially, to those traditions. It means
identifying with them in some measure. Identity then becomes less clear . . . .” H. PATRICK GLENN,
LEGAL T RADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 378 (4th ed. 2010).
219. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’ Y REV. 869, 889–90 (1988).

64

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:19

